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ABSTRACT 
Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitution requires that each house of Congress keep a Journal of its 
proceedings.  Contemporary observers have largely ignored this provision, treating it as a vestigial record-keeping 
requirement with little significance for modern law.  This dismissive attitude is misguided.  Historically, legislative 
Journals were one of the primary mechanisms by which Parliament, and later Congress, made and interpreted 
constitutional law.  Journals are the official histories of legislatures’ activity.  They record what legislatures do as 
institutions—what powers they exercise, what procedures they use, and what actions by the coordinate branches 
they protest or resist.  In systems in which many aspects of legislative power are not reviewable by outside courts, 
the historical record of a legislature’s actions, and of actions by other governmental actors which they accept as 
legitimate, are critical sources of legal precedent.  By keeping Journals, early Anglo-American legislatures learned 
to strategically manage this precedent in order to negotiate the contours of sovereign power with other governmental 
bodies.  In the mid-nineteenth century, this practice largely disappeared as legislatures turned their attention to 
newer forms of record keeping, such as transcripts of floor debates, which were designed to accommodate the policy 
agendas of partisan interest groups.  The institutional practices that evolved to enable legislatures to express 
collective judgments on questions of constitutional law through Journal-keeping atrophied.  As a result, by the 
twentieth century legislatures were largely considered to be incapable of the kinds of sophisticated legal analysis 
employed by courts and the Executive.  This assumption, which is now pervasive, has generated pessimism about 
Congress’s ability to engage in sustained, rational discourse on important questions of structural constitutionalism.  
The forgotten history of Journals and the Journal Clause demonstrates that legal reasoning by legislatures is not 
only possible in theory but was exercised in practice for centuries with a great degree of sophistication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitution requires that each 
house of Congress “keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time 
publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require 
secrecy.”1  This mandate that Congress keep and publish records of its official 
acts—the “Journal Clause”—has been largely ignored by the legal 
community.  No court has ever given it an authoritative interpretation, nor 
has any scholar written a definitive account of its origins or purpose.2  This 
neglect is unfortunate, because the tradition of journal-keeping that the 
clause codifies was once a core source of constitutional construction in Anglo-
American law. 
The few scholars who have mentioned the Journal Clause in passing have 
mostly understood it as a prototype of modern legislative practices.  In 
standard accounts of congressional procedure, for instance, the Journal 
Clause is usually written off as an antique form of legislative history—a 
“skeletal procedural record” with pre-modern origins, whose usefulness in 
deciphering congressional intent has been superseded by other, more 
voluminous paper records such as committee reports and the Congressional 
Record.3  Other commentators, looking for constitutional predicates to 
modern concepts of government transparency, have suggested that the 
Journal Clause was intended to serve an information-producing function.4  
 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.  
 2 See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 6:4 (2d ed. 
2018) (noting that the Journal Clause “has been the subject of very little judicial construction”). 
 3 Nicholas Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, 
and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L. J. 266, 271 (2013).  
 4 See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 744 n.155 (2012) (citing the 
Journal Clause as evidence of a requirement that legislative proceedings be mostly open to the 
public); Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the 
Constitution Constructs the Pathways of Information, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 281 (2003) (describing 
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Adrian Vermeule has argued that “[m]any participants [in the 
Constitutional Convention] desired to constitutionalize some version of a 
requirement that Congress publicize its deliberations and votes,” and that 
“[a]lthough the framers realized that transparency might distort deliberation 
. . . many delegates believed that future legislators could not be trusted to 
weigh the costs and benefits of transparency in public-regarding fashion.”5  
David Pozen likewise argues that the Journal Clause “contemplates 
legislative secrecy,” in its allowance that Congress may in its discretion keep 
proceedings secret, “but only as a deviation from a norm of publicity; the 
Constitution’s sole grant of a secrecy power is coupled to an anterior duty of 
disclosure.”6  These observers find the Journal Clause unremarkable.  They 
see it as an early mechanism for forcing democratic accountability, worth 
noting as a matter of precedent, but no longer relevant in any practical sense.  
These accounts are misguided. Because they view the Journal Clause 
through the lens of twentieth and twenty-first century legal concerns, modern 
commentators miss its true significance.  The Journals of the House and the 
Senate, and of the House of Lords and the House of Commons in the British 
Parliament, are not intended to facilitate transparency.  Indeed, from their 
origins in late medieval England until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, legislative Journals existed alongside highly restrictive regimes of 
legislative secrecy, under which both British and American legislatures 
forbade the public from observing or publishing accounts of their debates.  
Nor were legislative Journals intended to serve as tools of statutory 
interpretation.  They predate the modern concept of legislative history by 
several centuries.7 
Rather, the Journals are law-producing documents, and a critical 
medium through which Parliament and later Congress historically engaged 
in constitutional interpretation.  When Parliament began keeping official 
records of its proceedings in the thirteenth century, their purpose was to 
establish an institutional identity for the nascent legislature.  They performed 
this task in two ways: (1) by establishing precedents for the internal rules and 
procedures by which Parliament operated, and (2) by memorializing 
agreements with the Crown over the limits of parliamentary authority.  The 
 
the Journal Clause as a constitutional requirement that Congress make information public); 
Shannon E. Martin & Gerry Lanosga, The Historical and Legal Underpinnings of Access to Public 
Documents, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 613, 614 (2010) (citing the Journal Clause to state that the Constitution 
“clearly indicates that the actions of Congress shall be recorded and made public”); Barry Sullivan, 
FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and the People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 MD. L. 
REV. 1, 62 (2012) (categorizing the Journal Clause as a structural aspect of the Constitution that 
protects liberty). 
 5 Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 372 (2004). 
 6 David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 293 (2010). 
 7 See Parrillo, supra note 3, at 272–74 (describing the growing use of legislative history by courts from 
the mid-nineteenth century onward). 
 
1222 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:5 
intended audience for parliamentary Journals was not the public at large, but 
rather the Crown and future Parliaments.  Together, these functions formed 
the basis for a significant portion of English constitutional law.  The first 
function—establishing how Parliament functioned, and what the rights and 
obligations of the body and its members were—laid the groundwork for what 
later became known as the lex et consuetudo Parliamenti (“lex Parliamenti”), a body 
of law that developed concurrently with English common law and that 
governed the operation of the legislature.8  The second function—
negotiating the boundaries of parliamentary power—formed the basis for the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty that was established following the 
political conflicts of the seventeenth century.9  From early in their history, 
parliamentary Journals were considered by English law to constitute 
precedent-making acts of state.  By the seventeenth century, texts and 
treatises on the law of Parliament cited the Journals of the House of Lords 
and Commons as the authoritative source of law on the resolution of many 
constitutional disputes.10  
The legal importance of the English Journals reached its pinnacle during 
the seventeenth century.  The successive upheavals of the English Civil War, 
the Restoration, and the Glorious Revolution laid the foundation for the 
sovereignty of Parliament in British law.  Parliament, however, understood 
its victory over absolute monarchy not as the defeat of Britain’s existing 
political order, but as the defense of ancient liberties against royal excesses.  
The seventeenth century saw a revival of interest in ancient legal sources by 
Parliamentarians eager to root their political gains in a constitutional 
tradition.11  Consistent with this renewed focus on precedent, Parliament 
expanded and innovated on its Journal-keeping practices as never before.  
Committees were established to explore and report on the contents of the 
Journals to resolve constitutional disputes.  Controversial acts of Parliament 
were expunged by resolution, voiding their precedential effect.  The House 
of Lords began permitting members to enter formal dissents to legislative acts 
on its Journals.  All of this represented a new understanding that the content 
of Parliament’s records—the practices and legislative privileges asserted 
there and the powers over taxation and military affairs to which previous 
monarchs had formally consented—played a critical role in determining the 
contours of sovereign power and allowed those who held political authority 
to legitimize their position by pointing to a legal and historical tradition of 
 
 8 See infra Section I.B.  
 9 See infra Section I.B. 
 10 See infra Section I.B. 
 11 See infra Section I.C.  For a general discussion of the use of historical texts by parliamentary 
advocates in the seventeenth century, see JANELLE GREENBERG, THE RADICAL FACE OF THE 
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION (2001).  
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consensual gains.  By managing its records, Parliament was, in effect, 
interpreting and creating constitutional law.  
This tradition of resolving constitutional disputes—particularly disputes 
between the legislative and the executive power—by reference to legislative 
records was well known to the American colonies.  Parliamentary traditions 
strongly influenced colonial legislatures, and every assembly kept Journals in 
the British tradition.12  On the eve of American independence, colonial 
lawyers and politicians were as familiar with the practice of creating and 
interpreting legislative precedent as they were with common law precedent.  
The Journal Clause thus codified a practice that had become integral to 
Anglo-American constitutionalism by the late eighteenth century.  The 
Journals played a primary role in delineating the powers and obligations of 
the legislature and differentiating it from other departments of government.  
Historians have observed that the boundaries between the coordinate 
branches were not clearly defined in the early American republic.13  
Legislatures engaged in a variety of practices, such as resolving cases and 
controversies between citizens and administering public benefits, that would 
appear foreign to twenty-first century constitutionalists.14  Disputes with the 
executive were common.15  Indeed, as scholars of “departmentalism” have 
noted, not only were the powers of different government actors unclear in 
the early republic, so too was the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution 
itself.16  Incidences of the early Executive branch administering policy 
according to its own interpretation of the Constitution have been well 
documented.17  But the Journals provided a vehicle for the legislature to 
engage in constitutional interpretation as well.  As they had in Britain, the 
American Journals recorded Congress’s resolution of disputes over rules, 
privileges, and procedures.  They also recorded Congress’s decision to 
exercise, or not to exercise, jurisdiction over certain government powers.  In 
short, they formed a historical foundation for the institutional identity of 
Congress, as they had for the British Parliament.  
 
 
 
 
 
 12 See infra Section II.A. 
 13 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755 (1996) (“[A] 
genuine reconstruction of the Founding belies the contention that the Founders either always or 
primarily viewed the doctrine of separation of powers in modern formalist terms.”). 
 14 See infra Section II.C. 
 15 See infra Section II.C. 
 16 See infra Section II.C. 
 17 See infra Section II.C. 
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In a tripartite system of government in which many of Congress’s 
procedures and obligations were exempted from judicial review or executive 
control,18 the Journals’ role in developing that identity assumed 
constitutional significance.  Legislative records established precedent on 
separation-of-powers questions in a way that judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution alone could not.  In times of political crisis, the Journals also 
served as a medium for debating constitutional norms.  This was particularly 
so in the 1830s, when rising tensions over slavery and the combative policies 
of the Jackson presidency combined to generate a series of constitutional 
crises.  In several high-profile disputes—including a showdown between 
Jackson and the Senate over the President’s decision to defund the Second 
Bank of the United States and controversies in both houses of Congress over 
the right of citizens to petition for the abolition of slavery—Congress’s 
Journals, rather than the records of any judicial court, served as the primary 
medium of legal discourse.  Legislators revived ancient parliamentary 
practices such as expurgation in order to record their judgments on the 
Journals of Congress, often invoking the historical role that legislative records 
had played in constitutional construction.19  
The Journals declined in political importance beginning in the 1840s.  
There were no longer highly-publicized disputes over their contents, as there 
had been in previous decades.  But this was not, as some scholars have 
suggested, because the Journals were superseded by newer legislative records 
that performed their intended functions more effectively.  New documents—
in particular, the transcripts of legislative debate that were ultimately 
formalized as the Congressional Record—did replace the Journals.20  But the 
intended purpose of these records was radically different.  Beginning in the 
late 1700s, the centuries-long tradition of legislative secrecy in Britain and 
America was rapidly reversed.  Legislative debates, long held behind closed 
doors, were opened to the public and, more importantly, the press.  
Transcripts of these debates—quickly compiled and widely distributed—
became the ideal legislative record for the era of mass politics and mass 
communication.  While the transcripts were a boon for democratic 
accountability, however, their rise in prominence diminished the traditional 
role of legislative Journals.  The transcripts were fundamentally political 
documents; they allowed individual legislators to communicate (through 
floor speeches) their positions on specific political issues to their constituents 
and their parties with unprecedented rapidity.  The Journals, by contrast, 
were legal documents.  They provided the legislature with a medium for 
 
 18 See, e.g., James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially Unenforceable 
Rules that Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate Political Behavior, 40 
BUFF. L. REV. 645, 645–47 (1992) (describing the non-justiciability of constitutional determinations 
assigned to Congress by Article I). 
 19 See infra Section II.C. 
 20 See infra Part III.  
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debating constitutional norms, both within the confines of its own chambers 
and with the other branches of government.  They recorded the judgment of 
the institution as a whole on a legal issue, rather than the various positions of 
its constituent members.  The importance of these law-producing and law-
interpreting functions was lost as the attention of the public and the legal 
community shifted to newer forms of record-keeping.  As legislators were 
incentivized to tailor their on-record statements more toward regional or 
party constituencies, the older institutional dimension of their record-making 
receded. 
The effect of this change in record-keeping practice has been significant 
but underappreciated by contemporary historians and legal scholars.  Many 
of the structural constitutional issues that the Journals evolved to adjudicate 
continue to evade formal judicial resolution, either because they are 
considered “political questions”21 committed to the legislature by the 
constitutional text or because they depend on norms22 of governmental 
behavior that courts lack the competency to adjudicate.  These include 
consequential questions of legislative procedure and inter-branch relations.23  
But while Congress remains primarily responsible for resolving these 
disputes, modern observers no longer consider it capable of adjudicating 
them through the reasoned application of legal principles.  Rather, it is 
perceived to be uniquely (and perhaps exclusively) governed by the political 
 
 21 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (defining the political question 
doctrine in the context of deciding whether the claim before the Court was justiciable); Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (same); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (same); see also Louis 
Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 44143 
(2004) (describing the Supreme Court’s historical efforts to avoid imposing legal rules on political 
decision-making).  But see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court?  The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 237 (2002) (arguing that the 
political questions doctrine has declined in importance in recent jurisprudence).  
 22 Josh Chafetz, in a compelling discussion of some underused aspects of Congress’s constitutional 
authority, has written that the Constitution “leaves . . . the resolution” of “substantive issues” in 
structural constitutional law, as well as “the resolution of the meta-question as to the proper site of 
resolution for those issues,” to “constitutional politics.”  Chafetz, supra note 4, at 721–22 (emphasis 
and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of 
Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1113 (2011) (book review)).  The “space for conflict” created by 
“interbranch tension” produces an incentive for the Congress and the Executive to “compete 
publicly for the affections of the people” in a manner that “promotes healthy deliberation as to the 
public good” and requires each branch to “make its case in the public sphere.”  Id. at 722.  David 
Pozen has drawn on doctrines from other areas of law, such as self-help and bath faith, to examine 
these questions.  See David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885 (2016); David 
E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L. J. 2 (2014) [hereinafter Pozen, Self-Help]. 
 23 The literature on inter-branch relations, and on the difficulty of resolving constitutional disputes 
between the political branches non-judicially, is immense.  For two particularly insightful recent 
examinations of these issues, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2006) and Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22. 
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incentives of its constituent members.24  The courts, even in times of partisan 
conflict over the judiciary, are still widely treated as capable of applying 
content-neutral principles to the resolution of disputes.25  The Executive, too, 
through mediums such as Office of Legal Counsel memoranda and 
presidential veto and signing statements, can express coherent 
interpretations of constitutional law.26  While these interpretations may have 
partisan motivations, they are still legal, rather than political, in character.  
They present a formal analysis that is susceptible to critique and revision.  
The failure of Congress to provide any similar accounting for its institutional 
behavior—to rationalize, by reference to democratic principles or 
constitutional mandates, why it asserts or refrains from asserting certain 
powers, or why it applies particular rules of internal procedure—has created 
a legal vacuum in areas where reasoned discourse is badly needed.  Observers 
have worried that Congress’s substitution of partisan incentives for 
institutional ones has a destabilizing effect on democratic politics and leads 
to an escalating cycle of constitutional brinksmanship.27 
Although many lament the degradation of legal discourse within the 
political branches, there has been a noticeable failure to trace the root 
institutional causes of this dysfunction.  Lawyers and political scientists often 
treat the atomized, political behavior of Congress as an inherent feature of 
large elected bodies.28  The history of the Journal Clause provides a much-
needed corrective to this assumption.  The causes of our modern democratic 
pathologies are undeniably complex, and no single historical development 
can fully explain them.  But as scholars of administrative law have long 
recognized, record-keeping requirements are accountability mechanisms 
 
 24 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 640 (1995) (describing this 
attitude among twentieth century theorists). 
 25 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2010) (describing the role that institutional 
constraints and legal reasoning play in assisting judges to decide novel cases and structuring judicial 
discretion); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE (2010) 
(demonstrating how judges have historically rendered decisions that accommodate political 
realities, while still conforming to rule-bound methods of decision-making).  
 26 For an overview of contemporary debates concerning the interpretive role of the Office of Legal 
Counsel, see, for example, Sonia Mittal, OLC’s Day in Court: Judicial Deference to the Office of Legal 
Counsel, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211 (2015); Rachel Ward Saltzman, Comment, Executive Power 
and the Office of Legal Counsel, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 439 (2010).  For an overview of presidential 
interpretations of the Constitution through signing statements and other mechanisms, see Henry 
L. Chambers, Jr., Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Signing Statements, Executive Power, and 
Zivotofsky, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1183 (2016).  
 27 See infra Part IV.  
 28 The most influential expression of this idea has been in the field of political economy known as 
“public choice theory,” which holds that the legislative process is often co-opted by well-organized 
special interest groups who manipulate it for private gain.  See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility 
Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 180 (1996) 
(describing this theory).  While it is most often used to critique legislation in specific areas of public 
policy, it has also been employed to question the ability of the legislature to reason coherently within 
a system of second-order institutional rules.  See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 24, at 644. 
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that have an important effect on institutional behavior.29  By determining 
what categories of information institutions are required to record, and what 
audiences those records are presented to, societies mandate that institutions 
prioritize certain values and perspectives over others.  Records help structure 
the way in which institutions reason.  The seismic shift in record-keeping 
procedure within Anglo-American legislatures between the late-eighteenth 
and mid-nineteenth century—in which Congress, Parliament, and other 
elective bodies transitioned rapidly from regimes of extreme secrecy to 
extreme transparency; in which they began producing tens of thousands of 
pages of transcripts targeted at emergent voting constituencies and political 
parties; and in which they concurrently discarded the once-central practice 
of strategically managing and interpreting precedential official histories—has 
remained little studied.  This shift dramatically changed the types of 
reasoning in which American society incentivized its national legislature to 
engage.  As the legal community reckons with the consequences of 
unreasoned combat over questions of structural constitutionalism, it is worth 
remembering that deliberate choices in institutional design facilitated and 
normalized this behavior. 
This Article aims to recover the lost history of legislative constitutionalism 
contained in the Journals of Parliament and Congress, and to explore its 
relevance to contemporary law.  Part I recounts the origins of legislative 
Journal-keeping in England, from its beginnings in the late Middle Ages to 
its rise to constitutional prominence in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  Part II describes the development of legislative Journal-keeping in 
America, from the colonial period, through the drafting of the Journal 
Clause, to the important record-keeping debates of the 1830s.  Part III 
describes the rise of the transcripts of debate in the early nineteenth century 
and their eventual displacement of the Journals as the preeminent records of 
legislative activity.  Part IV situates the Journals within a theoretical legal 
framework and describes their relevance to modern constitutionalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of 
Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 101–03, 116–18 (2007) (noting among similarities 
between American and European governing that “reason giving is fundamental to the moral and 
political legitimacy of [their] legal orders”).  
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I.  LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS IN THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRADITION 
A.  The Early Origins of Legislative Journals 
The Journals of the House of Commons and the House of Lords are the 
authoritative records of official activity in each house of Parliament.  They 
evolved from the legislature’s earlier official records, the Rotuli Parliamentorum 
or “Rolls of Parliament,” which in turn consolidated a disparate body of legal 
documents and informal accounts of the convocations of Parliaments that 
began to emerge in the early twelfth century.30  The Journals are the 
authoritative record of Parliament’s proceedings, a status that was formalized 
by statute in the sixteenth century, and has been continuously reaffirmed by 
legal authorities since.31  Unlike statute books, the Journals’ primary purpose 
is not to record the positive law enacted by Parliament.  Rather, they record 
the means by which Parliament governs itself: the votes it takes, the 
resolutions it adopts, the rules it amends, and the external documents of 
which it takes cognizance.32  Every volume of the Journals represents the 
official institutional history of a parliamentary sitting, compiled by the clerk 
and unanimously approved by a vote of the members of each house.   
Parliament’s records played a critical role in establishing Parliament’s 
institutional identity, and in defining its relationship to the other organs of 
English government.  When the Crown began to call, or “convoke,” 
Parliaments in the thirteenth century, they did not have a permanent 
administrative structure, a defined jurisdiction or legal purpose, or an 
agreed-upon collection of legal powers.33  They were convened sporadically 
and often reluctantly because, pursuant to the terms of the Magna Carta, the 
monarch required the assent of the country’s nobility, as well as 
representatives of the counties, in order to levy taxes.34  At their beginning, 
they were no more than “afforced” or enlarged versions of the king’s advisory 
council of powerful nobles, clerics and ministerial advisers,  and were known 
in the early thirteenth century as “great councils.”35  These councils began 
to meet with greater frequency during the reign of Henry III, as a result of 
his need to finance wars in France, and began to be called ‘Parliaments’ in 
the middle of the thirteenth century.36  As the Crown’s financial needs 
 
 30 1 The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 1275–1504: Edward I, 1275–1294, at 1 (Paul Brand, 
ed., 2005) [hereinafter Parliament Rolls]. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at § A(ii). 
 33 See G.O. Sayles, The Functions of the Medieval Parliament of England 12 (1988). 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. (explaining the origins of more expansive king’s advisory councils). 
 36 See J.R. MADDICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924–1327, at 166–77 (2010) 
(explaining the origin of the term “parliament”). 
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increased, Parliament leveraged its control of the money supply to secure a 
larger and more stable role in governance, emerging as a more permanent 
institution in the early fourteenth century.37  Through its size and the 
geographic reach of its membership, it was also able to provide useful 
administrative support to the early modern state.  By the end of the thirteenth 
century, Parliament had evolved to serve a dual role in English government.  
On one hand, it served as counsel to the King, acting as a court to assist in 
the administration of justice and advising on increasingly complex matters of 
public policy.38  On the other hand, it also acted as a locus of resistance to 
perceived abuses and misgovernment, using its power to withhold taxes as a 
means of curtailing monarchial excess.39  This dynamic persisted throughout 
the late Medieval and early modern period as Parliament’s jurisdiction 
expanded, its membership expanded, and the complexity of its internal 
management increased.  
Parliament began keeping written records of its proceedings in the middle 
of the thirteenth century.40  These early documents appear to have focused 
on criticism of crown policy, and may have specified conditions attached to 
Parliament’s assent to new taxes.41  The Oxford Parliament of 1258, 
convened pursuant to an agreement with Henry III in exchange for a grant 
of supply for an invasion of Sicily, was larger and more sophisticated than 
previous meetings, and may have kept official records, though none have 
survived.42  The first extant Rolls of Parliament date from the reign of 
Edward I in the 1270s.43  From that time forward, the main business of 
Parliament was consolidated into the parchment rolls, which constituted the 
“master record” of the burgeoning institution.44  The Rolls were compiled 
and arranged by the clerk of Parliament, a position appointed by the Crown 
from among the clerks of chancery, but which owed loyalty neither to the 
monarch nor to the legislature.45  Medieval Parliaments did not maintain 
their own archives.  Once the contents of the Rolls were finalized, they were 
 
 37 See id. at 338–40, 352.  
 38 See, e.g., id. at 177–80 (describing the growth of Parliament’s role in advising the crown). 
 39 See id. at 173–75 (describing the use of Parliament’s power over taxation to influence royal policy); 
id. at 300–10 (same); see also id. at 218–26, 353–55 (describing role of Parliaments in resisting royal 
abuses and advocating for local issues). 
 40 Id. at 181; see also 1 MATTHEW PARIS, MATTHEW PARIS’S ENGLISH HISTORY FROM THE YEAR 
1235 TO 1278, at 398–400 (John Allen Giles trans., London, George Bell & Sons 1889) (recounting 
a hostile exchange between barons and Henry III being recorded); 2 MATTHEW PARIS, MATTHEW 
PARIS’S ENGLISH HISTORY FROM THE YEAR 1235 TO 1278, at 79 (John Allen Giles trans., 
London, Henry G. Bohn 1853) (recounting the creation of a council with recorded determinations). 
 41 MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 181. 
 42 MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 246–47. 
 43 Paul Brand, Introduction to 1 PARLIAMENT ROLLS, supra note 30, at § A(ii). 
 44 G.R. Elton, The Rolls of Parliament: 1449–1547, 22 HIST. J. 1, 1 (1979). 
 45 See A.F. Pollard, The Clerical Organization of Parliament, 57 ENG. HIST. REV. 31, 34 (1942) (explaining 
the process by which clerks of Parliament were appointed).  
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deposited with the Master of the Rolls, a Crown archivist, and stored with 
the records of the courts of chancery in Chancery Lane.46 
For the first several decades of their existence, the content and 
composition of the Rolls is inconsistent.47  However, in 1341, a regularized 
format emerged which persisted until they were displaced by the Journals as 
official records in the early sixteenth century.48  The Rolls recorded four 
primary items of business in a parliamentary session: (1) the opening 
“charge” or speech, and the opening sermon when one occurred; (2) the 
appointment by Parliament of the members of a sub-committee to receive 
and adjudicate private petitions; (3) grants of taxation; and (4) petitions 
submitted collectively by the Commons to the Crown, along with the 
Crown’s answers.49  Memoranda recounting important legal cases and other 
acts of government were also occasionally included.50  In addition, 
explanatory text linking the various agenda items increased, such that the 
Rolls were now “written up in the form of a discursive narrative” that would 
be legible to readers from future Parliaments and elsewhere in government.51  
By the fifteenth century, the Rolls also recorded the procedures by which 
legislative bills (which had emerged from the Commons’ petition as a distinct 
instrument of legislative procedure) were introduced and debated.52  This 
evolution in composition coincided with Parliament’s increased role in 
governance following the beginning of the Hundred Years’ War: as the 
Crown’s request for taxation increased, Parliament’s role in supervising royal 
expenditures grew, and its requests for royal concessions in exchange for 
grants of supply proliferated.53  
The Rolls, and later the Journals, were critical to facilitating the 
development of both (1) the legislature’s administrative capacities and (2) its 
role as the primary check on the royal prerogative.  With respect to its 
administrative capacities, the first and most important function of the early 
Rolls was to record (“enroll”) Parliament’s receipt and adjudication of 
petitions, or requests for a redress of grievances by private citizens.54  
Petitions were a common method of seeking relief from royal courts, but 
 
 46 Elton, supra note 44, at 12. 
 47 Brand, supra note 43, at 3; see also W.M. Ormrod, On—and Off—the Record: The Rolls of Parliament, 
1337–1377, 23 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 39, 40 (2004) (noting that “[t]here was little in the way of 
narrative text linking the various elements of business listed in the rolls, and little sense of a 
chronological arrangement: the early rolls read very much as memoranda compiled as a means of 
cross-referencing with other chancery series recording actions taken upon private and public 
business completed in parliament”). 
 48 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 39–40. 
 49 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 40. 
 50 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 40. 
 51 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 40. 
 52 Elton, supra note 44, at 4, 17. 
 53 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 40 (footnote omitted). 
 54 MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 298–99. 
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beginning in the 1270s, under the reign of Edward I, these requests began to 
be submitted to Parliament in very large numbers.55  Throughout the Middle 
Ages, petitioning constituted the overwhelming majority of Parliament’s 
governmental work.56  The handling of petitions was both a judicial function 
(in that it required Parliament to resolve individual, fact-specific complaints) 
and an administrative function (in that it represented the bulk of Parliament’s 
activity, and allowed it to take concrete action toward addressing problems 
of social and economic importance).  Petitions presented to Parliament were 
sorted by appointed judges and clerks known as “receivers,” who would 
review them, and either refer them to Parliament for resolution or transfer 
them to the appropriate prerogative court.57  Those referred to Parliament 
would be sent to an appointed committee of “triers,” usually nobles and 
bishops, for adjudication, and the contents of the petition, along with the 
answers of the triers, would be recorded or “enrolled” on the Rolls of 
Parliament at the end of each session.58  Prior to Parliament’s assumption of 
formal legislative powers, petitioning also developed into a quasi-legislative 
function, as the House of Commons would aggregate private petitions into 
consolidated commons petitions to present to the Crown for royal assent.59  
The records of petitions thus provided an account of the evolving scope of 
Parliament’s jurisdiction to address questions of policy.  
In addition to contributing to the formation of a parliamentary identity, 
petitioning also first established the legal authority of the Rolls as documents.  
Because of the judicial nature of Parliament’s petition work, the sections of 
the Rolls that reflected the hearing of petitions were the first portions to be 
recognized as having precedential force outside of the legislature itself.60  The 
petitions that were resolved by Parliament, rather than referred to a 
prerogative court, were often politically important, and the lords elected to 
act as triers were well educated in the common law.61  Edward Coke noted 
in the Fourth Institute that the comparatively thorough legal reasoning of 
Parliament’s petition resolution was a primary factor in elevating the 
authority of the Rolls, observing that “[t]he reason wherefore the Records of 
Parliament have been so highly extolled, is, for that therein is set down in 
cases of difficulty, not only the judgment, or resolution, but the reasons, and 
 
 55 MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 294. 
 56 MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 294, 298–99. 
 57 See Pollard, supra note 45, at 202–04; see also 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 11 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1681) (describing the duties of receivers). 
 58 See 4 COKE, supra note 57, at 11. 
 59 MADDICOTT, supra note 36, at 356–57. 
 60 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 42 (noting that the Parliament Rolls were “necessarily authoritative in 
regard to the legal cases heard in parliament”); see also H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles, The Early 
Records of the English Parliament, in THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES, at V 130 
(1981) (describing the documents prepared in the hearing of petitions and situations in which they 
were relied upon). 
 61 Richardson & Sayles, supra note 60, at VI 535–36. 
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causes of the same by so great advice,” and that while other common law 
courts recorded the reasoning for their holdings, “these also, though of great 
credit, and excellent use in their kind, yet far underneath the Authority of 
the Parliament Rols [sic], reporting the Acts, Judgments, and resolutions of 
that highest Court.” 62  Through the recording of petitions, Parliament came 
to understand itself as an institution that could interpret law as a court—it 
was in this period that it first came to be referred to as the “high court of 
Parliament”—and expect its interpretations to bind both subjects and 
coordinate governing institutions.63  It also came to see its Rolls as a critical 
source of legal precedent—as documents whose cataloguing of past 
legislative actions provided guidance in the resolution of future disputes.  As 
Commons petitions became more frequent, Parliament came to rely on the 
assistance of clerks (who had both access to the Roll archives at Chancery 
and knowledge of their contents) to draft petitions that referenced the 
precedents of previous Parliaments in order to strengthen their arguments.64  
Moreover, as the scope of Parliament’s activity expanded, and as it 
sought a stronger and permanent role in making and administering policy, it 
increasingly viewed the Rolls in their entirety—not just those portions that 
reflected its judicial business—as precedentially binding documents.  While 
its judicial functions were delegated to committees of lords, the idea of 
Parliament as a legal institution was not limited to those committees.  As 
historian G.O. Sayles has observed, “parliament is a single whole: its parts 
do not function separately: it is subject to a unifying authority.”65  For 
instance, in 1353, local representatives meeting with Commons specifically 
insisted that an ordinance that had been issued at the previous session “shall 
be repeated at the next parliament and entered in the roll of the same 
parliament, for the reason that the ordinances and agreements made in 
councils are not on record as they would be if they were made by common 
parliament.”66  Conversely, in 1404, Commons specifically demanded that 
its agreement to consent to an extraordinary tax levy not be recorded in the 
Rolls, and that all copies of the agreement be burned, so that it could not be 
used as a precedent for future grants.67  Demands such as these reflect a 
growing recognition that the written records of Parliament’s interaction with 
 
 62 4 COKE, supra note 57, at 34. 
 63 See, e.g., 4 HATSELL supra note 67, at 78 (tracing records of the judicial proceedings of the “High 
Court of Parliament” to the reign of Edward I (1239-1307)). 
 64 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 54–56 (footnotes omitted).  Occasionally the clerks may have even 
intentionally misrepresented past practices as a means of helping the Commons to strengthen its 
case. Id.  
 65 Richardson & Sayles, supra note 60, at VI 532. 
 66 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 43 (citing 2 PARLIAMENT ROLLS, supra note 30, at 253). 
 67 Chris Given-Wilson, The Rolls of Parliament, 1399–1421, 23 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 57, 64 (2004).  
 
May 2019] REDISCOVERING THE JOURNAL CLAUSE 1233 
the Crown could have legal implications for the authority of the legislature 
and its place within the broader architecture of government.68   
Aside from recording the accumulated body of Parliament’s legislative 
and adjudicatory work, the Rolls also recorded the traditions by which the 
legislature managed itself and disposed of its growing docket of public 
business.  Because Parliaments initially met infrequently, and were composed 
of a frequently changing membership, they required a robust institutional 
memory of how business was transacted, and how the two houses of the 
legislature interacted with each other and the Crown.  This institutional 
memory was learned primarily from the Rolls, which recorded the narrative 
history of prior sessions of Parliament, and thus provided a blueprint for the 
order of business in future sittings.  Perhaps the most important procedural 
development to emerge from the Rolls was the power of impeachment, 
which was exercised for the first time in 1376 against William Latimer, a 
Chamberlain of the Household of Edward III.  Commons accused Latimer 
on the Rolls of Parliament of corrupt dealings with the King, and Latimer, 
being a peer, denied the charges and demanded his right of trial by the Lords, 
where he was ultimately convicted.69  The precedent of accusation by 
Commons and trial by the Lords (according to procedures of their choosing) 
served as the basis for all future trials for those who were considered outside 
the jurisdiction of the prerogative courts.70   
Another significant change was the creation of the position of Speaker.71  
Speakers represented the entire House and presented requests to the Crown 
on their behalf.  On an institution-building level, this innovation was an 
important step in developing the corporate identity of Parliament as a 
cohesive entity that bargained collectively with the monarch for political 
concessions.  On a practical level, it also insulated individual members from 
retribution for voicing controversial opinions, a legitimate fear for much of 
Parliament’s history.72  Speakers also took primary responsibility for 
resolving disputes over the order of proceedings, a role which greatly 
 
 68 See Ormrod, supra note 47, at 42 (noting that while the “memoranda” on policy questions in the 
Parliament Rolls were not formally acknowledged as legally binding in the fourteenth century, 
“[n]evertheless, it does seem that the status of parliament as a court of record was also now of more 
general importance and was deemed relevant to other substantive business such as taxation and 
legislation”).  
 69 See 4 John Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons 57 (London, Luke Hansard 
& Sons 1818). 
 70 See id. at 56–69. 
 71 See 2 HATSELL, supra note 69, at 212–17 (citing the Rolls and Journals to trace the evolution of this 
position).  
 72 One of the most famous early examples of this sort of retribution was Haxey’s case, described infra, 
and in JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND 
DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 69–70 (2007). 
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facilitated the development of other areas of parliamentary law.73  Precedents 
of parliamentary practice such as these formed the basis for the modern law 
of legislative procedure.  They came to be regarded as the authoritative 
source for resolving disputes over the proper means of introducing, debating, 
and enacting legislation, and for carrying out other parliamentary business.  
Both the Crown and the legislature quickly recognized the practical 
importance of procedural precedents.  As Arthur Onslow, an eighteenth-
century Clerk of Commons, observed, “the forms of proceeding, as instituted 
by our ancestors, operated as a check and controul on the actions of 
Ministers; and that they were, in many instances, a shelter and protection to 
the minority, against the attempts of power.”74  Because the procedure of 
Parliament controlled how it conducted its affairs, and how it interacted with 
the monarch, procedural precedents could have a meaningful impact on the 
legislature’s ability to negotiate effectively and wield political influence.  
Inefficient procedure, or procedure that yielded strategic advantages to the 
Crown, could alter the outcome of substantive debates over law, policy, and 
finance.  As a result, both Parliament and the monarchy sought to establish 
favorable precedents on the legislature’s official records.  This impulse—or, 
conversely, the impulse to grant a procedural concession in a specific instance 
while stipulating that it should not be used as a precedent for future 
practice—is reflected throughout the Parliament Rolls.  For instance, in 
1402, Henry IV approved a parliamentary request to appoint a committee 
of Lords to “intercommune” with the Commons, but only “with the 
reservation that he did not wish to make this a right or a custom,” and that 
he had only “agreed to it of his special grace on this occasion;” he thus 
“charged the clerk of parliament that this reservation should be recorded on 
the Roll of Parliament.”75  
These procedural disputes could have significant implications for the 
operation of government.  In 1407, under Henry IV, a dispute over a grant 
of supply led to the establishment of two foundational elements of 
parliamentary law: (1) that all money bills must originate in the House of 
Commons, and (2) that the Crown may not take notice of any debate in 
Parliament until the two houses have come to an agreement and presented a 
formal report of their decision.76  Henry had requested the Lords to debate, 
in his presence, the state of the kingdom, and the necessity of granting 
subsidies to the Crown in order to secure the national defense.  After the 
Lords had specified the requisite sums, the King had sent a deputation to the 
Commons to demand that they assent to the grant.  The maneuver 
 
 73 See 2 HATSELL, supra note 69, at 230–36 (citing examples of the exercise of this function from the 
Rolls and Journals). 
 74 See 2 HATSELL, supra note 69, at 237. 
 75 Given-Wilson, supra note 67, at 64. 
 76 Thomas Pitt Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional History from the Teutonic Conquest to 
the Present Time 260 (Philip A. Ashworth ed., 5th ed. 1896) (1881). 
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represented a transparent attempt by the King to deny Commons any 
meaningful role in the tax deliberations, by presenting them a finalized grant 
of supply and, in effect, demanding their assent.  The Commons realized that 
allowing the process to stand on the Rolls as precedent could damage its 
ability to control the money supply in the future—a power which was, in the 
Middle Ages, its chief source of political leverage.  It thus recorded a reply to 
Henry stating that it was “greatly disturbed at it, saying and affirming it to 
be much to the prejudice and derogation of their liberties,” and refused to 
approve the supply.77  The King yielded to the Commons’ pressure, and 
agreed that the Crown would no longer receive such reports from one house 
of Parliament before both had “commune[d]” with each other.78  He was 
further compelled that this concession “should be entered as a record on the 
roll of parliament.”79  Henry Elsynge, the Clerk of the House of Commons 
in the early seventeenth century and one of the first treatise-writers to make 
a comprehensive study of the precedents contained in the Rolls and Journals, 
later confirmed the effect of this agreement, writing that it could not be 
shown “by any antient [sic] record, that the king did ever take notice of any 
of the commons speeches or consultations, until they were reported unto his 
majesty in open Parliament.”80  The written precedents contained in the 
Rolls thus formed the primary basis for justifying Parliament’s procedures, 
and its liberties against the Crown, as a foundational aspect of the law of 
English government.  
With respect to the Parliament’s role as a check on royal authority, the 
Rolls served two functions: they (1) recorded the evolution of Parliament’s 
privileges against interference and harassment by the Crown, and (2) 
recorded Parliament’s official protests of what it perceived to be 
unconstitutional exercises of royal authority.  With respect to the first 
function, parliamentary privileges are rights which, as the former Clerk of 
the House of Commons Sir Thomas Erskine May observed in his influential 
treatise on parliamentary practice, “are necessary for the support of [its] 
authority, and for the proper exercise of the functions entrusted to [it] by the 
constitution.”81  Like the recording of parliamentary procedure, the Rolls’ 
and Journals’ elaboration of parliamentary privileges was precedential in 
nature.  At its beginning, Parliament had no privileges of its own, but, as 
council and advisers to the King, claimed certain rights (specifically, the right 
of access to the King and the Speaker of the House of Commons, freedom 
from arrest while Parliament was in session, and freedom of speech) in their 
 
 77 Id. at 260. 
 78 Id. at 260–61; see also HENRY ELSYNGE, THE MANNER OF HOLDING PARLIAMENTS IN ENGLAND 
182 (London, Richardson & Clark 1768) (1624) (describing this exchange). 
 79 Given-Wilson, supra note 67, at 64. 
 80 ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 180. 
 81 Sir Thomas Erskine May, A Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament 
68 (9th ed. 1883). 
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capacity as servants of the Crown.82  For instance, in an answer to a petition 
to Edward I seeking leave to distrain, or seize property, for a debt owed by a 
member of Parliament, the King replied that “[i]t does not seem fit that the 
king should grant that they who are of his council should be distrained in 
time of Parliament.”83  This concession later served as the basis for the 
privilege of freedom from arrest.84  Parliament asserted such rights, which 
derived from royal prerogative, in petitions to the King, and those petitions 
along with the King’s answers were recorded in the Rolls and Journals.  
But as precedents proliferated, parliamentarians became more willing to 
assert these privileges as longstanding Anglo-Saxon rights that existed 
independent of the royal will.  Early treatise writers and lawyers relied heavily 
on the Rolls and Journals to prove the existence of inviolable legislative 
privileges in English law.  Freedom from arrest was never established by 
statute.  Indeed, the Lords refused to assent to a Commons petition to 
Henry IV seeking treble damages for a violation of its freedom from arrest, 
reasoning that sufficient penalties already existed in parliamentary law.85  But 
Elsynge suggested that this refusal by the Lords merely reflected the strength 
(and institutional importance) of recorded parliamentary precedent.  He 
argued that the Lords preferred to keep privilege of freedom from arrest, and 
the associated damages, as a matter of “antient custom” recorded on the 
Rolls, rather than enacting it into statute.86  To request the King’s assent to 
such a law would suggest that Parliament lacked the authority to establish its 
privileges and to assess punishment for breaches through their own records 
alone; the Lords “thought it more honourable to retain it, than to enact a 
new law to punish the contemners of their privileges, as if they had not been 
otherwise able to do it of themselves, but were subject to scorn and 
contempt.”87  
Elsynge dated the Crown’s implicit recognition of the privilege of 
freedom of speech to at least the reign of Edward III, observing that the Rolls 
reflected that “[Commons] did oftentimes . . . discuss and debate among 
themselves many things . . . ; and agreed upon petitions for laws to be made 
. . . yet they were never interrupted in their consultations, nor received check 
for the same.”88  The privilege was, in the account of most legal authorities, 
“signally confirmed” by Henry IV in 1397, in Haxey’s case.89  Thomas 
Haxey, a Member of Commons, had been condemned for treason by 
Richard II for introducing a bill criticizing the expenses of the royal 
 
 82 ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 175. 
 83 ERSKINE MAY, supra note 81 at 128 (quoting 1 PARLIAMENT ROLLS supra note 30, at 61). 
 84 ERSKINE MAY, supra note 81 at 128.   
 85 ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 187–88. 
 86 ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 188. 
 87 ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 188. 
 88 ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 177. 
 89 ERSKINE MAY, supra note 81, at 119. 
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household.  On the ascension of Henry IV, Haxey presented a petition asking 
the King to annul the judgment as “against the law and custom which had 
been before in Parliament,” which the King did, confirming in the Rolls that 
the former judgment was “of no force or effect.”90  The Commons’ 1407 
dispute with Henry IV over the King’s right to take notice of debates within 
either House of Parliament also served as an important precedent for 
Members of Parliament’s (MP’s) right to free speech.91  “If the king might not 
take notice of the subsidy” he had agreed to with the Lords outside the 
presence of Commons, then, Elsynge concluded, “much less might any thing 
else moved amongst the commons be reported unto his majesty before the 
commons were fully agreed thereon, and declared the same by their speaker, 
or otherwise, either unto the king or lords.”92  Similar precedents on the Rolls 
and Journals dating through the sixteenth century served as continuous 
confirmations of the privilege’s pedigree, though it too was never confirmed 
by statute.93  By the sixteenth century, the existence of Parliament’s core 
privileges was ritually invoked by the Commons’ Speaker at the beginning of 
each session: the Speaker would formally petition the Crown for a 
recognition of the liberties, and both the request and the Crown’s response 
would be recorded in the Journals.94  The assertion of such precedential 
authority for parliamentary privilege would not have been possible without 
the increasingly sophisticated record-keeping systems that evolved from the 
thirteenth century onward.95  
 
 
 
 
 
 90 ERSKINE MAY, supra note 81, at 119 (quoting 3 PARLIAMENT ROLLS, supra note 30, at 430). 
 91 ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 182. 
 92 ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 182. 
 93 See, e.g., ERSKINE MAY, supra note 81, at 119–22.  In 1512 in Strode’s Act, 4 Hen. 8 c. 8, Parliament 
declared by statute that the imprisonment of MP Richard Strode for introducing a bill was contrary 
to the privilege of freedom of speech.  However, controversies over the extent of the privilege 
persisted well after this period.  In Rex v. Hollis, Eliot and Valentine, the King’s bench held that Strode’s 
Act was a private act without general application.  CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 73.  The privilege 
was not recognized in statutory form until the English Bill of Rights in 1688.  ERSKINE MAY, supra 
note 81, at 123. 
 94 See, e.g., ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 176 (noting, with respect to the right of access to the king, that 
“[t]his request for access unto his majesty is first recorded, an. 28 H. 8. to be made by Richard 
Riche, speaker; then by Thomas Moyle, speaker, an. 33 H. 8. and afterwards by all others whose 
speeches are in the journals” (emphasis omitted)).   
 95 Elsynge likewise relied on the records of proceedings in the Rolls to establish the Commons’ right 
of access to the monarch, noting that from the reign of Richard II forward, “the commons, with 
the speaker, were ever admitted to the king’s presence in Parliament to deliver their answers: and 
oftentimes. . . they did propound matters to the king, which were not given them in charge to treat 
of.”  ELSYNGE, supra note 78, at 176.   
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In addition to establishing the law of privilege, a second means by which 
the Rolls served as a check on royal power was through the recording of 
protests.  As early as the thirteenth century, prior to the introduction of the 
Rolls, Parliament used written records as medium for criticizing crown 
policy, or for emphasizing that their assent to taxation only permitted funds 
to be spent in certain ways.  Matthew Paris records that when Parliament 
convened in 1242 to debate a request from Henry III to finance a military 
expedition in France,96 they granted further funds, but only on the condition 
that the King first make good-faith attempts to negotiate for peace, and “in 
order that the tenour of the barons’ reply might not be lost in oblivion, these 
things were all reduced to writing,” memorializing the agreement.97  A 
similar grant in 1244 included a written record of the King’s agreement that 
military expenditures be overseen by a committee of nobles.98  In its early 
years, these protests began to instill Parliament with a collective 
understanding that its rights and its interests were separate from those of the 
Crown.  As Parliament grew in size and influence, and as its control over 
taxation became established by the precedent of successive Kings, protests 
entered on the Rolls began to exercise a meaningful constraining effect on 
the Crown.  By the fourteenth century, the legislature began to enter 
conditions for how the Crown could spend grants of supply on the Rolls, and 
to demand oversight of royal expenditures from independent treasurers.  For 
instance, in 1348, Commons specifically insisted that the conditions which 
they had attached to the grant of a new tax “should be entered on the 
parliament roll as a matter of record, by which the commonalty could have 
remedy, if anything is attempted to the contrary in times to come.’’99  In 
1371, the Commons unsuccessfully petitioned the Crown to appoint a 
committee of treasurers to oversee the  expenditure of funds.100  But, by the 
1400s, it had become common practice for Commons to make grants of 
supply dependent on the Crown’s fulfillment of certain conditions, which 
were recorded in the Parliament Rolls.  In 1404, for instance, Commons 
granted a large supply to Henry IV on the condition that it be expended 
according to the terms of the grant, and that the dispensation be overseen by 
treasurers appointed by Parliament.101  
 
 
 
 
 
 96 1 PARIS, supra note 40, at 398-99. 
 97 1 PARIS, supra note 40, at 400. 
 98 2 PARIS, supra note 40, at 12. 
 99 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 42–43. 
 100 Ormrod, supra note 47, at 47. 
 101 TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 76, at 259. 
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Parliament also combined the practice of protesting with its leverage over 
taxation to demand that successive Kings “confirm” rights that were either 
granted to Parliament in the Magna Carta, or other charters, or were 
believed to exist as a matter of governing precedent, in exchange for grants 
of supply.  In 1297, Edward I issued the best-known confirmation, the 
Confirmatio Cartarum, a reaffirmation of the rights granted in the Magna Carta, 
in exchange for Parliament’s grant of supply for war in France.  Parliament 
was particularly eager to reaffirm the principle that no taxes could be levied 
without its consent, as it worried that their consent “might turn to a bondage 
to them and their heirs, because they might be at another time found in the 
rolls,” and thus made explicit in their record that “we shall not draw such 
aids, tasks nor prises into a custom, for anything that hath been done 
heretofore, or that may be found by roll in any other manner.”102  
Confirmations like this enjoyed an ambiguous status, as something between 
a routine legislative record and (because they received a form of royal assent) 
something like a statute.103  Yet monarchs could and often did attempt to 
ignore the terms of these agreements: Henry III inspired numerous protests 
by his supposed disregard for the terms of the Magna Carta and its 
subsequent confirmations.104  Edward I went so far as to receive an 
absolution from Pope Clement V authorizing him to disregard the 
Confirmatio, though he never acted on it.105  The real value of the 
confirmations was not in the binding effect of a single record entry, but in 
the cumulative effect of successive monarchs agreeing on public record to be 
bound by the charters in exchange for financial assistance.  They were, like 
other parliamentary rights, precedential in nature. 
By providing an authoritative chronology of Parliament’s rights, its 
procedures, and its position within the broader constitutional order, the Rolls 
and Journals played a critical part in establishing the legislature as a legal 
entity with a coherent identity and a claim to state power.  They facilitated 
its transition, in the words of G.O. Sayles, from an “occasion” to an 
“institution.”106  This first aspect of the Journals’ importance might be 
labeled a ‘constitutional law-producing’ function.  Early Parliaments did not 
necessarily conceive of themselves as permanent institutions that constituted 
part of a broader constitutional order.  They did not initially believe that they 
were engaging in a legal discourse by, for instance, petitioning for recognition 
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of privileges; or establishing written traditions of debate and internal 
organization; or receiving requests from private petitioners; or creating a 
written record of their criticisms of crown policy.  But they did understand 
themselves as inhabiting a world governed in part by tradition, and in part 
by a series of carefully negotiated agreements with a nearly absolute 
monarch.  And they understood the importance of creating a written record 
that interpreted those traditions and agreements favorably, and they created 
space in the constitutional order for an institution that could restrain the 
monarchy and represent the interests of other social and political 
stakeholders.  The use of written records to develop those traditions built a 
body of precedent that ultimately came to be accepted as public law and 
formed the foundations of English constitutionalism.   
B.  Journals in the Sixteenth Century 
By the sixteenth century, Parliament did begin to develop an institutional 
consciousness and to conceive of itself as institution with legal rights and 
obligations within a broader constitutional order.  The legislature was still 
largely subservient to royal will: Parliaments did not meet regularly, and 
criticism of crown policy was infrequent.107  But while Parliament did not 
make any dramatic claims to constitutional authority, it did begin to establish 
its institutional autonomy in significant ways.  The Speaker reasserted the 
existence of Parliament’s privileges at the opening of each session, and 
Commons began to assert the right to enforce its own privileges through its 
Serjeant-at-Arms.108  Legislative procedure was formalized considerably, and 
rules of proceeding were further reticulated.109  New and more sophisticated 
fixtures of internal organization were established.  For instance, in 1571, 
Commons established a “committee for motions of griefs and petitions” for 
the first time to centralize the process of formulating petitions to the Crown 
and reducing them to writing.110  This process instituted a more systematic 
study of Parliament’s historic records (which provided legal precedents on 
which petitions could draw), and also pushed Parliament further in the 
direction of recording new requests for relief in a regularized format, and 
according to a predetermined strategy.111   
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The process for introducing and enacting legislation was also refined.  
Bills and petitions were still used interchangeably to request the monarch’s 
assent to official acts.112  But Parliament now used these devices more 
aggressively to attempt to initiate topics for discussion and legislation, an 
initiative that had previously belonged, for the most part, to the Crown.113  
Most prominently, the Commons repeatedly attempted to petition 
Elizabeth I for a redress of grievances concerning the grant of royal 
monopolies.  While the queen was willing to negotiate on the substance of 
these complaints, she consistently maneuvered to prevent the parliamentary 
record from reflecting that the initiative for reform had originated with 
Parliament rather than the Crown.  In 1571, 1589, and again in 1598, 
Elizabeth I, aware that petitions were being formulated by the Committee 
for Motions of Griefs and Petitions, preempted formal requests for legislation 
by promising her own relief.114  Commons was also aware of the precedential 
importance of records reflecting the Crown’s accession to its demands, and 
sought to record that accession in the Journals despite the queen’s evasions.  
In 1601, when the Queen again promised monopoly reform in response to a 
parliamentary petition, a member moved that her response “might be 
written in the books and records of this House.”115  Robert Cecil, the Queen’s 
chief minister, demurred on the request, replying that the Queen did not idly 
“notify in public a matter of this weight.”116  Other members insisted.  One 
protested that, “[a]s the Gospel is registered and written, so would I have 
that also.”117  Another observed that “[r]ecords remain [in existence for] long 
[periods of time]” and urged that “the clerk may” record the response.118  It 
is not known whether the reply was ultimately recorded on the Journal, since 
it has been lost (the Queen’s proclamation on monopolies appeared the next 
day),119 but the exchanges over monopoly reform reflect an understanding 
on the part of both Crown and Parliament that procedural records in the 
Journals could have meaningful implications for the balance of power within 
government. 
All of these developments were made possible by the existence of 
increasingly sophisticated records: more elaborate procedures required more 
meticulous documentation; more aggressive assertions of parliamentary 
authority required a longer and more convincing pedigree.  It was in the 
early sixteenth century that the Journals supplanted the Rolls as the official 
documents of legislative activity and began to assume their present form.  
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While the Rolls encompassed the activity of Parliament as a whole, the 
Journals were divided into two separate series of books: one for the Lords, 
which began in 1509, and another for Commons, beginning in 1547.120  
More and better educated clerks were tasked with modernizing Journal 
practice; transcription was improved; the format of records was 
rationalized.121  
Procedural steps were also taken to ensure that Journal manuscripts were 
approved by the membership of each house and protected from tampering.  
The Clerks of Parliament were now selected by the Houses and appointed 
by the Crown under letters patent.  They were appointed to serve for life, 
suggesting that they were intended to be politically independent, and 
insulated from periodic changes in the composition of Parliament.  Upon 
assuming office, each Clerk took an oath, kneeling before the Lord 
Chancellor, swearing to: “[M]ak[e] true entries, remembrances, and journals 
of the things done and past in the same . . . [and] keep secret all such matters 
as shall be treated in his said Parliaments; and not disclose the same before 
they shall be published, but to such as it ought to be disclosed unto.”122   
Indeed, in 1641, the Clerk was sanctioned for allowing a Member to take 
the Journals from the Clerk’s table and examine them without the permission 
of the House.  In response, it was resolved that:  
[I]t was a fundamental order of the House, that the Clerk, who is the sworn 
officer, and intrusted with the entries, and the custody of the records of the 
House, ought not to suffer any Journal or record to be taken from the table, 
or out of his custody; and that if he shall hereafter do it, after this warning, 
that at his peril he shall do it.123  
Clerks were forbidden from making entries into the Journals except on 
the orders of the House, and individual Members could not, of their own 
initiative, direct the official records of the session to be altered.  For instance, 
in 1628, when the House of Lords requested the Journal record of a speech 
made by a Member of the House of Commons, Commons replied that no 
such record existed on its books, because the transcription “was without 
warrant at all times, and in that Parliament, by order of the House, rejected 
and left.”124  Clerks, thus, did not take notes of proceedings “without the 
precedent directions and command of the House, but only of the Orders and 
Reports made in this House.”125  Thus even if a speech was made in 
Parliament, and “any number of Members, call[ed] out to have them taken 
down . . . this call of particular Members, though ever so general, is not 
properly, indeed cannot be, an Order of the House.” 126  In short, as 
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Parliament began to rely more heavily on its precedents to build sophisticated 
structures of internal organization, and to press more ambitious claims of 
privilege against the Crown, it became aware of the need for official records 
that were equal to those tasks, and that accurately reflected its decisions on 
points of parliamentary law. 
More significantly, both parliamentarians and other English legal 
authorities began to conceive of the increasingly sophisticated body of 
institutional history collected in the Journals not only as received tradition, 
but as law.  Because Parliament had historically spent a significant portion of 
its time adjudicating petitions for relief—either in the form of complaints 
against abusive royal officials, or requests for assistance through private 
bills—it had come to be regarded not only as a legislature, but also a “court 
of record”—in the words of one contemporary, “the highest and most 
authentical court of England.”127  From the fourteenth century onward, only 
the House of Lords exercised formal judicial functions, such as the hearing 
of appeals from royal courts.128  But in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
parliamentarians and other legal authorities began to regard the broader 
universe of precedent contained in Parliament’s records—those aspects that 
touched on privilege, procedure, and Parliament’s attempts to enforce the 
obligations of the monarch through its control of taxation; not just its 
adjudication of private petitions—as a coherent body of law, as authoritative 
in the realm of government as the common law was in private law.  This 
doctrine was known to English authorities as the lex et consuendo Parliamenti 
(“lex Parliamenti”), or the “law of Parliament.”129  
And just as the common law could be learned from the records of 
judgments by common law courts (which were also assuming a more 
regularized format in this era),130 so could the law of Parliament be learned 
from consulting the records of legislative judgments contained in the Rolls 
and Journals.  By the seventeenth century, it was widely accepted that “[t]he 
Laws, Customs, Liberties, and Privileges of Parliament are better to be 
learn’d out of the Rolls of Parliament, and other Records, and by Precedents, 
and continual Experience, then [sic] can be expressed by any one mans [sic] 
pen.”131  Two doctrinal developments in this era are of particular 
importance.  First, through statutory acts and through the gradual 
accumulation of a body of legal thought contained in influential treatises, 
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Parliament affirmed that its records were the authoritative sources of the lex 
Parliamenti.  Parliament first suggested that the Journals were official state 
records in 1514 in “An Act Concerning the Burgesses of the Parliament,” 
which prohibited members of Parliament from departing before the end of a 
parliamentary session, unless they had received the license of the Speaker, 
“and the same license be entered of record in the book of the clerk of the 
Parliament appointed or to be appointed for the common house.”132  Many 
later British treatise writers identified this 1514 statute as establishing the 
Journals as official records of Parliament.  The Lex Parliamentaria, a prominent 
seventeenth-century treatise, noted that the “Book of the Clerk of the House 
of Commons is a Record, as it is affirmed by Act of Parliament, 6 Hen. 8, 
c.16.”133  Edward Coke, in the Institutes, likewise noted that “the Journals of 
the house of the lords, and the book of the clerk of the house of commons, 
. . . is a record, as it is affirmed by act of Parliament in anno 6 H. 8. ca. 16.”134  
 These records were thus widely acknowledged as the most authentic 
source of parliamentary law.  Erskine May later summarized:  
The only method . . . of proving that this or that maxim is a rule of the 
common law, is by shewing that it hath always been the custom to observe 
it . . .  it is laid down as a general rule that the decisions of courts of justice 
are the evidence of what is common law.  The same rule is strictly applicable 
to matters of privilege, and to the expounding of the unwritten law of 
Parliament.135  
By the seventeenth century, Edward Coke could even proclaim that 
records of “common law courts” were “far underneath the authority of the 
Parliament rols [sic].”136  In short, by the end of the sixteenth century, 
Parliament was able to claim that its judgments as recorded in its Journals 
represented binding law on questions of legislative power and privilege.  
The second principle Parliament asserted was that only it had the right 
to determine the contents of its own records.  Blackstone wrote that “the 
whole of the law and custom of Parliament has it’s [sic] origin from this one 
maxim; ‘that whatever matter arises concerning either house of Parliament, 
ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that house to which it 
relates, and not elsewhere.’”137  “Hence,” May later confirmed, “it follows 
that whatever the Parliament has constantly declared to be a privilege, is the 
only evidence of its being part of the ancient law of Parliament.” 138  This 
meant that not only Parliament, but the Crown and courts, were required to 
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accept Parliament’s records as definitive evidence of parliamentary law, such 
that “by another law and custome of Parliament the king cannot take notice 
of any thing said or done in the House of Commons, but by the report of the 
House of Commons.”139  By the end of the seventeenth century, it was widely 
accepted that Parliament’s Journals were conclusive, self-authenticating 
evidence of what was said and done by the legislature.  John Hatsell, the 
Clerk of the House of Commons in the late eighteenth century and the 
author of a well-known treatise on parliamentary procedure, recorded in 
1785 that “the Journal of the lords is a record, to which every subject may 
resort for information; and the mode of acquiring this information to the 
House of Commons, is, by their appointing a Committee to inspect the 
record, and to report the same to them.”140  
C.  Journal-Keeping as Constitutional Argument During the English Civil War 
The Stuart period and the Civil War era revealed the full potential of 
official legislative records to advance substantive constitutional arguments.  
Two innovations in Journal practice were particularly important to this 
evolution.  One was Parliament’s adaptation of centuries-old procedural 
mechanisms to make new and more ambitious claims on sovereign authority.  
Charles I’s avowed belief in a powerful monarchy, his suspected Roman 
Catholic sympathies, and his aggressive attempts to collect revenue without 
the consent of Parliament precipitated fears about the security of England’s 
legislative institutions and Protestant religion.  In response to perceived 
encroachments on parliamentary rights, MPs and legal authorities 
marshaled evidence to contest the legality of the Crown’s actions.  Elsynge, 
as Clerk of Commons, combed laboriously through the old Rolls to collect 
precedents supporting the House of Lords’ power of impeachment, which it 
began to wield against corrupt royal officials.141  The Rolls and the Journals 
gained new prominence as proof of a centuries-old tradition of parliamentary 
independence and negotiated power-sharing agreements between the 
legislature and the Crown.  Parliamentarians realized that it was to their 
advantage to interpret these records in ways that legitimized their claims to 
constitutional authority, by presenting them as the logical extension of the 
body of parliamentary law that had accumulated since the thirteenth 
century.  As disputes over sovereignty escalated, MPs with legal training, 
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such as Edward Coke, engaged in a project of re-conceptualizing Journal-
keeping as an explicit form of legal argument.  The most visible manifestation 
of this trend was in the use of ancient parliamentary procedures, such as the 
practice of petitioning or entering protests of crown policy on the legislative 
record, to draft and publicize legal arguments.  Many of the most significant 
constitutional documents of the seventeenth century followed this pattern.  
The 1628 Petition of Right, for instance, adapted the ancient practice of 
petitioning the Crown for private legislation to a new, more explicitly 
constitutional purpose: demanding the Crown’s recognition of certain 
fundamental limitations on royal authority, including the power to levy taxes 
without parliamentary consent and to impose martial law.142  It was a radical 
reimagining of the concept of petitions, which in previous centuries had 
requested specific forms of assistance or asked for the Crown’s confirmation 
of longstanding privileges, and it was the product of several decades’ worth 
of reforms to petition procedure.143  From the beginning of James I’s reign in 
1604, Parliament’s own understanding of its place in the constitutional order 
diverged sharply with the Crown’s.  Petitioning, which became significantly 
more formalized in this period, played a critical role in mediating the 
constitutional disputes that ensued.  Parliament continued to assert the right 
to initiate reform legislation, rather than to merely request concessions from 
the Crown in exchange for grants of supply.  It also began to request 
concessions from the Crown on issues that had historically been considered 
solely within the royal prerogative, such as foreign relations, royal marriage, 
and monopolies.  In 1621, for instance, the Commons presented a 
“remonstrance and petition” to James I criticizing his position on 
Catholicism, and his proposed marriage of Prince Charles into the Spanish 
Hapsburgs, by which they sought to “humbly . . . shew . . . what may be 
prejudicial to the King and the state.”144  
In advancing new legal claims, Parliament was assisted by a subtle 
procedural development in the manner of drafting and presenting petitions.  
Historically, there had been no single process for petitioning the Crown, and 
aside from the distinction between individual and Commons petitions, the 
petitions themselves were not subdivided into separate legal instruments.  In 
the early seventeenth century, under the guidance of Edward Coke, 
Parliament came to differentiate between petitions of “grace” and petitions 
of “right.”145  Petitions of grace requested an act of grace from the Crown—
a gratuity that it was under no obligation to provide—and therefore did not 
require an answer.  These were useful, because they allowed Parliament to 
document its increasing participation in areas of policy traditionally reserved 
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for the Crown, while minimizing any immediate claims on legal authority, 
and thereby reducing the risk of royal backlash.  Petitions of right, on the 
other hand, presented grievances to the Crown, usually after the grievances 
had been investigated by a committee, and demanded redress as a matter of 
law.  By inventing the concept of a petition of right, Parliament impliedly 
assumed the authority to declare its own rights and the rights of its subjects, 
and to insist that the Crown bring its policies into conformity with those 
rights—a dramatically new claim to constitutional power.  In 1604, for 
instance, Commons submitted a petition criticizing the Crown’s exercise of 
its purveyance power (historically a matter of prerogative) as “against law 
and right.”146  Though Commons conceded the Crown’s prerogative to exact 
purveyance (i.e., the right to purchase provisions at less than market value), 
it claimed to have proven through committee investigations that the 
prerogative had been exercised abusively, and therefore illegally.147  While 
theoretically limited in their scope, such petitions memorialized an important 
shift in parliamentary thinking: Parliament had begun to assume the 
authority to judge the legality of the Crown’s actions.   
The tradition of entering protests of crown policy on the Journals, too, 
was adapted to advance new constitutional arguments.  Where previous 
protests had objected to the King’s execution of specific domestic or military 
projects, Civil War-era protests made more aggressive demands for the 
reform of royal administration and openly asserted Parliament’s rights and 
privileges as immutable aspects of the English constitution.  Unlike petitions, 
remonstrances neither asked for the Crown’s cooperation as a matter of 
grace nor demanded it as a matter of right: they simply declared on the 
parliamentary record that the Crown had acted contrary to law in some way.  
The Stuart Kings were aware of Parliament’s attempts to build a written 
record of its privileges and its right to participate in deliberations on issues 
touching the royal prerogative and resented them.  In 1614, James I issued a 
warning to Parliament “against excess of lavish and licentious speech of 
matters of state,” speech which Parliament considered privileged under its 
right to freedom of debate.148  The conflict culminated in 1621, when the 
King sent a message to Parliament justifying the detention of MP Sir Edwyn 
Sandys, who had been arrested in connection with his opposition activities.149  
James reprimanded “those fiery spirits of some of the House of Commons, 
who had presumed to argue and debate publicly of matters far above their 
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reach and capacity, tending to our high dishonor, and breach of Prerogative 
Royal,”150 and commanded Parliament to “resolve” that the Crown was 
“very free and able to punish any man’s misdemeanors in Parliament.”151  
The Commons, outraged at the King’s open attack on its freedom of speech, 
responded with a remonstrance stating that its privileges were “its ancient 
and undoubted birthright.”152  The protest was ordered to be “presently 
entered of Record in the Journal of the House.”153  The King, in a final 
attempt to abrogate Parliament’s claimed right to opine on matters of state, 
“sen[t] for the Journal Book,” and struck out the “[e]ntry with his own 
hand,” and “in full assembly of his Council, and in the presence of the Judges, 
did declare the said protestation to be invalid, annulled, void, and of no 
effect,” and ordered it “erased out of all memorials, and utterly 
annihilated.”154  The ringleaders of the protest, including Coke and John 
Pym, were imprisoned in the Tower of London for their role in drafting it.155  
Likewise, in 1626, Charles I reprimanded Parliament for conducting an 
“unparliamentary inquisition” against the Duke of Buckingham, a close 
personal ally, and warned it against interfering in matters of state.156  
Commons again responded with a “[r]emonstrance,”157 in which they 
informed the King that “it hath been the ancient, constant, and undoubted 
right and usage of [P]arliaments, to question and complain of all persons of 
what degree soever, found grievous to the commonwealth.” 158  
The tradition of protestation reached its apotheosis in the Grand 
Remonstrance, a sweeping list of 204 grievances presented to Charles I in 
1641.  Like the Petition of Right, the Grand Remonstrance adopted a form 
of parliamentary record that had previously been used to address specific 
grievances, and used it to demand systemic constitutional change, requesting 
changes in religious policy and parliamentary oversight of royal 
administration.159  The implication of the document was that the sovereign 
authority of the Crown was bounded by the constraints of English law, a 
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position Charles I resisted.  Also like the Petition of Right, the Remonstrance 
was so bold it proved unacceptable to the King and precipitated yet another 
dissolution of Parliament.  As one historian of the English Civil War has 
summarized, the Remonstrance “masqueraded as a document for the 
attention of the King, but it was in truth addressed to the people: it was a 
public statement by the Commons accusing the King, a procedure as yet 
unheard of in the annals of England.”160  Both the Petition of Right and the 
Grand Remonstrance demonstrated the possibility of adapting ancient 
parliamentary forms of record-keeping to assert new rights and powers on 
behalf of the legislature, and to situate new claims to constitutional authority 
within existing legal traditions.  
The second innovation in Journal practice during the seventeenth 
century was Parliament’s creation of new record-keeping procedures to 
manage this body of written precedent as it rapidly increased in size and 
complexity.  The developments of the Stuart era—the appropriation of old 
legislative functions to challenge royal authority; the reinvention of old 
judicial functions to try cases of impeachment and attainder—transformed 
Parliament into an institution that purposefully and self-consciously 
interpreted constitutional law.  The Rolls and the Journals incentivized 
Parliament to reason precedentially and provided the legislature with the 
legal and procedural vocabulary to bolster its legitimacy by situating its rise 
to supremacy within the historical evolution of the English state.  But the 
purpose of employing a body of official records to advance claims on 
constitutional power was to demonstrate that those claims derived naturally 
from existing notions of law and existing understandings of the distribution 
of authority within the state.  The rapid proliferation of new Journal 
entries—new assertions of parliamentary privilege, more expansive claims on 
the legislature’s jurisdiction, new and more sophisticated forms of legislative 
procedure—could threaten to subvert the usefulness of those records by 
transforming them into a jumble of opportunistic and contradictory 
constitutional arguments.  
As succeeding regimes gained control of the legislature—from the Long 
Parliament, to the Restoration Parliament, to the Cavalier Parliament and 
the Convention Parliament of 1689—they recognized the need to harmonize 
parliamentary precedent with Parliament’s present claims about the 
structure of the constitution.  New Journal-keeping devices facilitated this 
harmonization.  One was a procedure known alternatively as “expurgation,” 
“erasure,” or “obliteration.”  By “expunging” a Journal entry, a house voted 
to order the clerk to cross that entry out of the relevant Journal book, 
officially “erasing” it from the parliamentary record and voiding it of 
precedential effect.  In a sense, expurgation was also an innovation on an 
older form of Journal-keeping procedure.  The Houses of Parliament had 
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long exercised the right to alter their Journals to correct factual errors or 
errors in transcription (which were more common in earlier eras, before the 
professionalization of the clerical staff).161  Seventeenth-century Journal 
practice expanded the conception of error correction to encompass not only 
factual errors, but legal or constitutional errors as well.  Under this new 
understanding, an “incorrect” constitutional judgment of Parliament could 
be erased from its records, no differently than a Clerk’s error in recording a 
vote or the enrollment of a petition.  The Long Parliament began this 
practice in the 1640s.  In 1645, the House of Commons ordered the vacation 
and expurgation from the Journals of an order from 1643 impeaching and 
expelling the member Henry Marten for suggesting the abolition of the 
monarchy.162  Likewise, in 1647 both Houses of Parliament ordered the 
expurgation of a petition that had been accepted and enrolled the previous 
year which criticized the conduct of the parliamentary army.  The order 
stated that: 
The Lords and Commons, being tender of the Honour of the said Army, 
have thought fit to Ordain and Declare, and be it Declared and Ordained, 
. . .That the said former Declaration . . . be rased and expunged out of the 
Records and Books of the said Houses; and wholly taken away, and made 
void: And that no Member of the said Army shall receive any Damage, 
Prejudice, or Reproach, for any thing in the said former Declaration.163 
The Rump Parliament that reconvened in 1659, and the Convention 
Parliament of 1660 that followed it, significantly enlarged the practice of 
expurgation. Several parliamentary committees were appointed to review 
the Journal entries of the Long Parliament in their entirety and “make 
Report of what they shall think fit to be expunged thereout, as treasonable, 
and scandalous to his Majesty, and his Royal Father, of blessed Memory.”164  
These Committees, which were established in 1659,165 1661,166 and 1685,167 
were tasked with revising the official parliamentary record of the previous 
twenty years to render it consistent with the constitutional values of the 
Restoration.  Significant procedural decisions were obliterated, including 
Cromwell’s dissolution of Parliament (Henry Scobell, the Clerk of the Long 
Parliament, was granted indemnity upon admitting he had entered the order 
of dissolution in the Journal book)168; any orders mandating members of 
Parliament to take the oath of “Engagement” under Cromwell169; a 
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resolution of December 18, 1648, permitting members of the House of 
Commons to dissent from a resolution of the House accepting Charles I’s 
conditions for peace170; an order June 9, 1649 suspending members who 
refused to dissent from the agreement to peace171; and orders permitting the 
election of new members to replace those who were suspended.172  For good 
measure, the Committee was also directed to investigate, “expunge and 
obliterate” any “other Votes there are of this Nature; and report their 
Opinion to the Parliament, Which of them they conceive fit to be 
vacated.”173  During this period, Parliament used expurgation to resolve less 
overtly political disputes as well.  In Skinner’s Case, the House of Commons 
challenged the House of Lord’s right to assume original jurisdiction in civil 
suits and declared its adjudication of a suit against the East India Company 
illegal.  The dispute was resolved in consultation with Charles I, who 
recommended that the Lords obliterate all records of its proceedings in the 
case, which it did, effectively abandoning its jurisdictional claims.174  
The purpose of expurgations was not to erase or manipulate the historical 
record, but to provide a procedural method by which Parliament could void 
the “precedents” on its records when those precedents were no longer 
consistent with constitutional values.  Expurgation did remove any reference 
to an order from printed copies of Parliament’s Journals, aside from footnotes 
indicating that an entry had been annulled.175  But as later historians have 
discovered, clerks rarely attempted to erase previous legislative acts from the 
original manuscript Journals in the parliamentary record.  This was 
demonstrated most prominently by a resolution of 1661 to reverse an act of 
attainder passed by Parliament against the Earl of Strafford.  Strafford had 
been the Lord Deputy of Ireland, and was accused by the House of 
Commons of conspiring with Charles I to raise a royalist army in Ireland to 
suppress the parliamentary cause.176  After a failed impeachment for treason, 
Commons and Lords passed a bill of attainder for treason against Strafford 
in 1641.  His subsequent execution was an important precipitating event in 
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the Civil War.177  In 1660, the House of Lords resolved to expunge the record 
of Strafford’s attainder from its Journal books.178  The order of expurgation 
vacated the act of attainder, and directed the clerk to physically erase it from 
the manuscript Journals.179  Yet the House of Lords chose only to obliterate 
the bill of attainder passed against Strafford—the actual parliamentary act 
of condemnation—while leaving the records of the impeachment untouched. 
Indeed, while the Restoration Parliament resolved to reverse the attainder 
itself within a year of convening, it debated for over thirty-five years on 
whether to expunge the impeachment proceedings from the Journal before 
deciding against it.180  It was only in 1698 that the special committee of the 
House of Lords concluded that “by former Orders made by this House, 
relating to the cancelling and obliterating of the Earl’s Attainder, it could not 
be intended that any other Proceedings should be obliterated than those 
relating specially to the said Act of Attainder” and that:  
[W]hatsoever stands crossed upon the Journals, relating to the Proceedings 
of the Impeachment of the said Earl, ought not nor shall be looked on as 
obliterated; and that the several Orders for obliterating and vacating any 
Proceedings concerning the Earl of Strafford must be taken to have been 
intended as to what related to the Act of Attainder only.181  
These specifications insured that there would be no confusion as to 
whether the procedural requirements for passing a bill of attainder had been 
altered.  More importantly, they emphasized the legal function of 
expurgation—not to erase historical memory, but to amend the evolving 
record of parliamentary law to indicate that a particular action of Parliament 
was no longer valid, and that no future precedential use could be made of it.  
Thus the “obliterated” attainder in the Lords manuscript Journal was not 
actually erased, but only lightly crossed out, leaving “no difficulty in reading 
every word.”182  
A second development of this era was the decision to allow 
parliamentarians to enter written dissents on the Journals.  Like modern 
judicial dissents, these entries registered MPs’ opposition to actions taken by 
Parliament.  Unlike other procedural innovations of the era, the practice of 
dissenting was limited to only one house of Parliament, the House of Lords.  
The tradition of entering individual protests on the Lords’ Journals began in 
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the sixteenth century. Early protests were entered primarily in response to 
religious measures taken under the Reformation,183 and were recorded in the 
Journal simply as a list of the names of dissenting peers under the title 
dissentientibus.184   But during the Long Parliament written dissents, giving 
reasons for Lords’ disagreement with a legislative act, began to appear.  
These entries were officially authorized in 1642 by a standing order “[t]hat 
such Lords as shall make Protestation, or enter their Dissents, to any Votes 
of this House, shall make their said Protestation, or give Directions to have 
their Dissents entered into the Clerk’s Book.”185  It is noteworthy that the 
House of Lords, where opposition to the Crown was much more equivocal 
than in Commons, authorized this practice at the same moment that 
Commons was perfecting the use of the ancient tradition of collective 
protests, or remonstrances, to advance increasingly radical constitutional 
arguments.  The Commons explicitly denied its members the right of 
entering individual protests in its Journals during its debate on the Grand 
Remonstrance in 1641.186  
A majority of peers frequently opposed the radical measures undertaken 
by Commons during the political crisis of the 1640s.187  As a result, those 
sympathetic to the parliamentary cause were forced to develop their own 
procedural innovations to advance constitutional arguments in the upper 
house, and to deny royalist peers the appearance of united opposition to the 
Commons.  The practice of dissenting reveals the extent to which 
parliamentarians began to view their Journals not only as a procedural 
record, but as a medium for constitutional dispute.  For instance, in 1642, 
the Commons proposed the Militia Bill, whereby they requested that Charles 
I cede control of the Army to Parliament to suppress the uprising in Ireland.  
The Lords, and ultimately Charles, rejected the bill, and the dispute over the 
armed forces became one of the precipitating causes of the Civil War.  One 
of the first formal protests of the Lords was by a minority who dissented 
against the Peers’ decision not to support the Commons’ request for control 
of the army, a measure it called “absolutely necessary to the settling of 
present distempers.”188  Many such protests were entered throughout the 
eighteenth century, and the practice of protesting continued until well into 
the twentieth.  
 
 
 183 1 James E. Thorold Rogers, A Complete Collection of the Protests of the Lords with Historical 
Introductions vi–vii (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1875). 
 184 Clyve Jones, Dissent and Protest in the House of Lords, 1641–1998: An Attempt to Reconstruct 
the Procedures Involved in Entering a Protest into the Journals of the House of Lords, 27 PARL. 
HIST. 309, 309–10 (2008). 
 185 5 Mar. 1641, 4 HL Jour. 625, 628 (1642). 
 186 1 ROGERS, supra note 183, at xvi–xvii. 
 187 WEDGWOOD, supra note 160, at 388. 
 188 1 ROGERS, supra note 183, at 910.  
1254 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:5 
By the end of the seventeenth century, the Journals, as the living records 
of Parliament’s actions and its interactions with the Crown, had become one 
of the primary vehicles for structuring debate on the English constitution; the 
form and functions of the legislature; and the distribution of governing power 
within the state.  The addition of new procedural mechanisms allowed 
Parliament to adapt to the increased scope of its written precedent in this 
period (through the use of committee review); changes in that precedent over 
time (through the use of expurgation); and the existence of contemporaneous 
disagreement among MPs on questions of constitutional importance 
(through the entry of dissents in the Lords’ Journals).  Of course, not every 
question of parliamentary law could be given a definitive answer by 
consulting Parliament’s records.  Significant aspects of England’s governing 
traditions are, as scholars commonly observe, “unwritten” and practiced 
solely out of received tradition.189  And even where Parliament’s records did 
serve as a source of legal authority, they were not necessarily the only source.  
Sometimes the records confirmed the continuing validity of other external 
documents, such as the Magna Carta.  In other instances, rules or privileges 
that were initially derived from Journal practice were later codified by 
statute.  Parliament’s records did inform many points of lex Parliamenti.  
But more importantly, they defined Parliament as an institution that 
makes and interprets constitutional law.  Proving this capacity was critical to 
establishing the legislature’s legitimacy as a governing institution, particularly 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the supreme sovereignty 
of Parliament was first asserted.  John Locke, for instance, discussed the 
importance of a legislature that was itself governed by law in his Second Treatise 
of Government, arguing that:  
For all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, 
as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by 
established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their 
duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers, too, 
kept within their bounds.190  
Blackstone, who resisted Locke’s appeals to popular sovereignty,191 also 
believed that the law of Parliament promoted the legitimacy and stability of 
 
 189 See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 23–
24 (London, Macmillan & Co. 3rd ed. 1889) (1885) (noting that rules can be “written or unwritten,” 
derive from “custom” and “tradition,” and consist of “conventions, understandings, habits, or 
practices”). 
 190 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 72–73 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690).  
 191 To Locke’s contention that “there remains still inherent in the people ‘a supreme power to remove 
or alter the legislative, when they ‘find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them,’” 
Blackstone replied that devolving sovereign power to the people would result in “dissolution of the 
whole form of government established by that people,” and thus “annihilate[e] the sovereign 
power” and “repeal[ ] all positive laws whatsoever before enacted,” making any permanent law 
impossible.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142, *157.  A society could only achieve 
 
May 2019] REDISCOVERING THE JOURNAL CLAUSE 1255 
the English government.  He recognized that legislative authority that was 
entirely unbounded by law posed a threat to just government, and that 
British subjects would be “without remedy” if Parliament, “being the highest 
and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction in the 
kingdom,” should abuse its power “by any means” of “misgovernment.”192  
Rules of Parliament’s own making could act as a restraint on the 
legislature without subverting its sovereign authority, and constitutional 
history proved that they had done so.  The Journals provided the means by 
which the “rulers” in Parliament demonstrated—to each other, to the 
Crown, and, increasingly, to the public—that they were themselves governed 
by the rule of law.  “[A]s every court of justice hath laws and customs for it’s 
[sic] direction,” Blackstone explained, “some the civil and canon, some the 
common law, others their own peculiar laws and customs, so the high court 
of parliament hath also it’s [sic] own peculiar law, called the lex et 
consuetudo parliamenti”—a law that could best be learned “out of the rolls 
of parliament, and other records, and by precedents, and continual 
experience.”193  
II.  LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRADITION 
A.  The Status of Journals in the Colonial Era 
Americans of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries inherited 
traditional British understandings of constitutionalism.  They viewed the 
“constitution” not as a single master-statement defining the law of 
sovereignty, but as a collection of individual liberties and restraints on 
state action that were grounded in historical precedent.  Its contours 
were gleaned from evidence of longstanding practice or prior agreements 
between governing institutions.  Such precedent endowed the exercise of 
power with the legitimacy of consent—the Crown, the Parliament, or the 
colonies were invested with a particular authority, because the historical 
record proved that all of the stakeholders in the legal system had previously 
recognized that liberty or authority as rightful.  By the eighteenth century, 
this understanding began to assume the familiar aspects of the theory of 
government by contract or consent.194  Some legal authorities viewed the 
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“constitution” in purely descriptive terms—it was, literally, the collection of 
common law and institutional precedent that constituted the government, 
and it could be altered as new sovereign agreements superseded previous 
ones.195  Others—particularly American and English Whigs—viewed it in 
more normative terms, as a governing order that was derived from historical 
precedents, but that ultimately reflected the dictates of natural 
law.196  But Americans generally agreed that the limits of what the 
government could do were determined by evidence of what it had done in 
the past.   
As a result of this widespread emphasis on historical precedent, in the 
colonial era arguments in constitutional law, like arguments in common law, 
often reasoned by analogy from past historical practice to resolve 
contemporary disputes over sovereign power.  John Reid has labeled this 
form of argument “forensic” history.197   The resolution of specific disputes 
sounding in tort or contract were thought to reveal the general principles by 
which the common law operated.  Under what Coke dubbed the “artificial 
reason”198 of the law, as one recent article has summarized: 
[The legal practitioner would] perceive[ ] a relevant similarity between the 
situation involved in some previous decision and the situation at issue in the 
instant case, and then use[ ] the analogy between the previous decision and 
the instant case to argue that the instant case ought to be decided in the same 
way as the previous one.”199   
In the same way, the resolution of disputes over individual rights or 
sovereign authority were thought to reveal more generally applicable 
doctrines of the law of government.  The American colonists were, for 
instance, aggressive in opposing the relatively minor taxes that Parliament 
enacted in the early 1760s, not primarily because of the law’s onerous terms, 
but because they feared that by acquiescing they would be deemed by 
extension to have ratified the general legitimacy of parliamentary laws 
enacted without colonial representation.  As one American opponent of an 
excise tax on cider argued in 1763, “if this new extension of the Excise-laws 
is confirmed, it must effectually justify and authorise every future extension 
of them which can be proposed, till the Excise becomes general.”200  
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Likewise, two years later Attorney General Charles Yorke argued that the 
Stamp Act was a “precedent” which “may . . . be in argument extended far, 
to other future taxes, upon the colonies.”201  “That,” as Reid explains, “was 
one reason American whigs rioted—to keep the Act from becoming a 
precedent.”202  The knowledge that discrete political acts could serve as the 
basis for general propositions of constitutional law strongly affected legal 
thinking.  Lawyers and political advocates thus frequently deployed historical 
arguments in the service of a legal agenda.203 
A number of legal historians have explored the importance of precedent 
in early American law.204  But in examining how precedent was interpreted, 
they have often overlooked the corollary question of how and why it was 
generated in the first place.  The accumulation of precedent was not a passive 
process.  While historical precedent generally was accorded greater 
importance in the eighteenth century than it is today, the law placed a special 
emphasis on written documents.  “Like all Englishmen,” writes Gordon 
Wood, “the colonists were familiar with written documents as barriers to 
encroaching power.”205  And of all of the forms of written precedent, those 
that came from institutions invested with sovereign power—such as 
legislatures, courts, and the Crown and its executive officers—carried the 
greatest weight.  Moses Mather summarized the importance colonists 
accorded to the written agreements whereby Parliament had reduced royal 
authority, “[a]nxious to preserve and transmit” their rights “unimpaired to 
posterity,” the English people had repeatedly “caused them to be reduced to 
writing, and in the most solemn manner to be recognized, ratified and 
confirmed,” by the Crown, and “afterwards by a multitude of corroborating 
acts” culminating in the English Bill of Rights and the Acts of Settlement.206   
Governing institutions understood this dynamic.  Not just courts, but 
legislatures and executive officials, were aware that the documents that had 
the greatest persuasive weight in constitutional argument were those that 
they generated in the course of their official duties.  The statements that they 
issued protesting or acceding to an assertion of authority by a coordinate 
department; the portions of their records that they relied on in legal debates; 
and the portions that they deliberately expunged—these things shaped the 
universe of historical precedents that lawyers could rely on in pressing 
constitutional arguments.  The constitution changed as the written sources 
of legal authority changed.  As the English legal theorist Thomas Rutherford 
 
 201 3 REID, supra note 194, at 160. 
 202 3 REID, supra note 194, at 160.  
 203 3 REID, supra note 194, at 160. 
 204 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 195, at 11–14 (discussing various forms of precedent used in legal 
arguments during America’s early history); 3 REID, supra note 185, at 160–67 (same); WOOD, supra 
note 194, at 259–68. 
 205 WOOD, supra note 194, at 268. 
 206 WOOD, supra note 194, at 268. 
 
1258 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:5 
wrote in the 1750s, “[w]hatever constitution . . . might appear from former 
usage to have been established in any civil society,” a “different or contrary 
usage, after it obtains, will afford the same evidence, that the governors and 
the people have mutually agreed to change the constitution.”207  By 
controlling the contents of their historical records, these institutions could 
exert considerable influence over the direction of constitutional debate.208  
Record-keeping practices determined which historical precedents existed 
and which of those continued to be recognized and relied upon by the 
constituent elements of the state.  Just as modern courts are strategic in 
drafting opinions, aware that the legal conclusions they place on the judicial 
record will be applied to a wide array of future disputes, so were the Anglo-
American governmental institutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries strategic in composing their official records.209  Compilers were 
guided by a combination of constitutional values, institutional goals, and 
political concerns in determining what their official records did—and did 
not—say.  
Legislative Journals were particularly important to the process of 
precedent creation in America, beginning in the colonial era.  There were 
two reasons for this.  First, the legislature had gained considerable theoretical 
and practical significance in Anglo-American government.  In England, 
Parliament had largely established its supremacy.210  As a result of its 
unequaled legal and political authority, the constructions it placed on issues 
of constitutional law carried unique weight.  It was, if not the only interpreter 
of the constitution, at least the most important.  Legislatures had outsized 
importance in the colonies as well.  They were the primary representatives 
of local colonial populations within the imperial government.211  They also 
took responsibility for many aspects of political administration, enacting local 
laws and adjudicating legal disputes.212  Because colonial legislatures were 
responsible for most of the daily administration of American affairs, their 
records, like those of medieval Parliaments, had a practical importance that 
made them difficult for the royal authorities to ignore. By the seventeenth 
century many assemblies began to view themselves as colonial analogues of 
Parliament—endowed with the same constitutional legitimacy to make and 
 
 207 KRAMER, supra note 195, at 16. 
 208 Reid recounts an illustrative episode in which the Massachusetts House of Representatives doctored 
portions of a letter between the Massachusetts governor and Charles II to prove that it had never 
consented to direct parliamentary legislation.   3 REID, supra note 194, at 162. 
 209 For an overview of the self-conscious act of precedent-creation by courts, see generally Paul J. 
Watford et al., Crafting Precedent, 131 HARV. L. REV. 543 (2017).  
 210 3 REID, supra note 194, at 73-75. 
 211 See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics 6–9 (1967).  
 212 Id. Mary Patterson Clarke, in her extensive history of parliamentary privilege in the colonies, has 
examined the growth of the assemblies’ judicial functions, and their roots in ancient parliamentary 
practice.  See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN 
COLONIES 15–38 (1943).  
 
May 2019] REDISCOVERING THE JOURNAL CLAUSE 1259 
interpret law within their localized jurisdictions as Parliament was in 
England.  As the lower house of the Maryland Assembly expressed on its 
record in 1697, it was “in like nature to the Parliament of England as to this 
province.”213  Second, colonial assemblies inherited the legislative record-
keeping practices that had developed in England since the thirteenth century, 
which enabled them to build and manage precedent with much greater 
sophistication.  All of the assemblies kept Journals after the parliamentary 
tradition, and by the early eighteenth century the form and procedure for 
recording them had become relatively formalized.214  
Much like early Parliaments, colonial assemblies quickly learned that by 
strategically managing their historical records, they could actively direct the 
evolution of institutional relationships in government.  Colonies often 
leveraged their Journals to interpret their powers and privileges in ways that 
significantly expanded their autonomy.  The relationship between colonial 
assemblies and royal governors, the Crown’s appointed administrators on 
the American continent, was not well defined when the colonies were first 
chartered.  While colonial legislatures understood themselves as continental 
analogues of Parliament, and governors as extensions of the Crown, in theory 
by the eighteenth century the governors wielded much greater executive 
authority in America than the monarch did in English domestic affairs.  
Royal governors had the right to prorogue colonial assemblies at will, a 
power that had been severely limited in England by the Glorious Revolution 
and the Triennial and Septennial Acts; the Crown still enjoyed an unfettered 
veto over colonial legislation; and royal governors still retained the right to 
appoint and remove colonial judges at will.215 
As early as the seventeenth century, colonial assemblies made concerted 
efforts to import the doctrines of parliamentary privilege that had emerged 
in England into American legislative practice, and to record and refine those 
precedents in their Journals in order to bolster their legal rights against the 
incursions of the royal government.  Many began imitating the 
parliamentary practice of having the Speaker petition for recognition of the 
body’s privileges—freedom of speech, access to the governor, and freedom 
from arrest—at the beginning of each session and recording the petition on 
the Journal.216  Colonies enforced these privileges as well and recorded their 
assertions in Journals.  In South Carolina, in 1701, for example, a member 
of the South Carolina assembly insulted the royal governor during a debate 
on an admiralty bill.  The governor dissolved the debate in retaliation, and 
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the assembly formally protested on its Journal that the dissolution was a 
violation of its freedom of speech, which was “their undoubted right.”217  
Freedom from arrest was asserted more aggressively, as most colonies 
enacted this freedom as a positive statute, rather than relying exclusively on 
Journal precedent.218  But here, too, Journals still played an important role.  
In several colonies, including Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Jamaica, 
assemblies later expounded the statutory protection from arrest by voting for 
resolutions which formally defined its contours.219  More importantly, 
colonial assemblies continued to exercise the traditional authority that 
Parliament had to define and punish breaches of this privilege through 
formal, quasi-judicial proceedings.220  The right to exercise this authority, 
and the procedures by which it was exercised, were derived from 
parliamentary practice and from the assemblies’ own Journal precedents.221  
Assemblies also developed legislative precedent that enabled them to expand 
their jurisdiction to governmental functions that had historically rested with 
royal governors, including determining the time and duration of sittings, the 
appointment of judges, and (critically) control of finances.222  
Yet the colonists’ relationship with Journal precedent was not merely 
opportunistic.  To the extent that they viewed themselves as replicas of the 
English Parliament, endowed with the same rights and privileges, they also 
understood their Journals to embody a coherent doctrine of parliamentary 
law. Colonial lawyers and legislators were well acquainted with the English 
doctrine of lex Parliamenti.223  Through the publication of scholarly English 
treatises (which were enabled by the professionalization of parliamentary 
staff and the renewed institutional focus on records in the seventeenth 
century), Americans became familiar with the extensive body of Journal 
precedent that had developed since the middle ages. Thomas Jefferson, who 
served as the Clerk of the Virginia House of Burgesses, relied extensively on 
Hatsell—whose compendium of parliamentary Journal precedents he 
 
 217 CLARKE, supra note 212, at 94. In an extensive dispute between the Maryland assembly and the 
royal governor in the 1740s over the extent of that body’s freedom of speech, both parties made 
arguments on the legislative record attempting to justify their positions through interpretations of 
parliamentary precedent and the English Bill of Rights.  CLARKE, supra note 212, at 96–97. 
 218 CLARKE, supra note 212, at 100–02. 
 219 CLARKE, supra note 212, at 102. 
 220 CLARKE, supra note 212, at 103–05. 
 221 CLARKE, supra note 212, at 103-05 (defining adjudicative procedures and punishments and citing 
colonial Journals).  Some colonies did define their punishments by positive statute, including 
Massachusetts which enacted a schedule of fines for breaching the privilege against arrest.  
CLARKE, supra note 212, at 104 n. 23. 
 222 ANDREWS, supra note 212, at 37. 
 223 See, e.g., Warren M. Billings, Justices, Books, Laws, and Courts in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 85 LAW 
LIBR. 277, 286 (1993) (describing the influence of English parliamentary treatises on legal and 
legislative practice in colonial Virginia); see also CLARKE, supra note 212, at  20–22 & n.15 
(describing the adaptation of parliamentary-style adjudication by American colonies). 
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described as “preeminent”—as well as Elsynge and a host of other English 
authorities to develop his understanding of legislative law and procedure.224   
The keeping of Journals also enabled assemblies to conceptualize 
themselves as adjudicative bodies, that not only made positive law but acted 
collectively to interpret and apply legal concepts.  Colonial assemblies played 
a crucial role in adjudicating private legal disputes, acting (as medieval 
Parliament did) as a court of law that resolved cases through the application 
of precedent.225  While not every private petition for relief was recorded in 
colonial Journals, the most prominent were.226  Assemblies also played an 
important role in adjudicating disputes over public law, including monetary 
claims against colonial governments.  Here, too, Journals helped establish a 
new area of legislative jurisdiction and conditioned the legislature to behave 
as a body that created and applied legal precedent.  Christine Desan has 
examined the example of New York, whose colonial assembly extensively 
adjudicated citizens’ claims for government compensation in the eighteenth 
century.  As Desan notes, New York “did not simply inherit adjudicative 
authority,” but rather “had to invent that authority” by constructing 
precedent.227  Thus, “[t]he formulaic entries in the assembly Journals 
[adjudicating public claims] and in the official rhythms of the statutes 
[awarding compensation] reveal starkly the constitutional innovations that 
brought the legislature its jurisdiction to determine public claims.”228  For the 
historian reviewing New York’s colonial legislative record, “the shape of 
government itself suddenly fills the pages of the assembly Journal.  The claims 
discussed . . . tell the story of everyday administration,” and “reveal the 
public activity of the province, outlining the areas on which its officials spent 
money.”229 
 
 
 
 
 224 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE 
OF THE UNITED STATES xxviii (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1993) (1801).  The list of sources 
Jefferson consulted in compiling his authoritative manual of legislative procedure is found in the 
1993 edition published by the Government Printing Office.  Id. at xv–xxi.  
 225 See, e.g., Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for A Redress of Grievances: 
Cut from A Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 27–40 (1993) (summarizing the emergence 
of colonial petitions from English practice). 
 226 For most petitions, only the fact of the reception and a brief description of the contents were 
recorded, for fear of overwhelming the pages of the Journals.  See 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: PETITION HISTORIES AND NONLEGISLATIVE OFFICIAL 
DOCUMENTS xvi (Kenneth R. Bowling et al., eds., 1998). 
 227 Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early 
American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1409 (1998). 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 1436. 
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Moreover, while the seventeenth century had seen the most significant 
use of parliamentary records to resolve constitutional questions, Journal 
disputes continued to occur in England in the eighteenth century and to 
capture the attention of the American public.  The case of John Wilkes, MP 
for Middlesex, was the most prominent of these. Wilkes had won his seat in 
Commons in 1768, but the House subsequently declared him ineligible on 
the basis of certain allegedly libelous articles he had published years earlier 
which had offended George III and his allies in Parliament.  The controversy 
pit competing theories of legislative power (Josh Chafetz has labelled these 
“Blackstonian,” for William Blackstone, and “Millian,” for John Stuart Mill) 
against each other. 230  Traditional theories of parliamentary rights, which 
viewed the authority of Parliament over its own proceedings as absolute and 
inviolable, supported the right of Commons to exclude Wilkes for any reason 
it deemed proper.  Blackstone defended the House’s right to exclude Wilkes 
as not only “evident from precedents,” but “clear from reason,” because “it 
would expose the judicature of the house of commons to the most flagrant 
insult and contempt . . . if the member expelled to-day, should be forced 
upon it to-morrow.”231  More modern theories, influenced by increasingly 
popular norms of electoral accountability, held that Parliament could not 
exercise its privileges in a manner that was subversive of democratic rights. 
Edmund Burke warned against granting Parliament uncontrolled power 
over seating members, arguing that “all men possessed of an uncontrolled 
power leading to the aggrandizement and profit of their own body have 
always abused it.”232  
Following a public campaign lasting six years (in which some sixty 
thousand subjects petitioned the Crown on his behalf), Wilkes was finally 
seated in Parliament in 1774.233  In 1782, he succeeded in having the House 
resolution declaring him ineligible expunged from the House of Commons 
Journal “as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this 
kingdom.”234  The Wilkes case became a cause célèbre among American 
Whigs, themselves chafing at what they perceived as the overbearing exercise 
of parliamentary authority.  “Wilkes and Liberty” was a popular rallying 
cry.235  William Palfrey, member of Boston Sons of Liberty and associate of 
John Hancock, wrote to Wilkes in 1768 that the colonies desired ministers of 
the Crown who were “reverenced and loved by the people,” and for 
enlightened members of Parliament, and hoped that Wilkes would be one 
such member.236  The extensive use that both sides made of Journal 
precedent in adjudicating the controversy, and the effort Wilkes himself 
 
 230 CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 156–58. 
 231 CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 158. 
 232 CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 157. 
 233 See CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 156–58; 3 REID, supra note 194, at 22–26. 
 234 22 William Cobbett, Parliamentary History of England 1411 (T.C. Hansard ed., 1814).  
 235 Arthur H. Cash & John Wilkes: The Scandalous Father of Civil Liberty 231–32 (2006). 
 236 Id. at 233. 
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made in having the prior judgment of the House expunged from the Journals 
to formalize his legal victory, reflects the continued prominence of legislative 
Journals in constitutional discourse during the eighteenth century.   
B.  Drafting the Journal Clause 
The drafting of the Journal Clause at the Philadelphia Convention 
solidified the importance of legislative Journals as law-producing documents 
and reinforced their status within the hierarchy of government records.  
Article I sought to achieve apparently conflicting goals. Responding to the 
failures of the Articles of Confederation, it endeavored to craft a national 
legislature that was both sufficiently powerful and sufficiently independent to 
carry into execution the state-building agenda of a larger and more 
centralized federal government; and that was also confident enough in its 
constitutional authority to check incursions by competing branches of 
government.237  At the same time, Article I also attempted to ensure that the 
national legislature was sufficiently governed by rules and democratic norms 
that it did not become overweening or tyrannical—an increasingly urgent 
concern by the late 1780s, when state legislatures had come to be seen by 
many as dangerous instruments of populist rule.238   
The Journal Clause responded to both concerns.  With respect to the 
need for a more muscular and constitutionally assertive legislative branch, 
the clause served to codify a tradition of precedential recordkeeping that had 
been one of the primary tools of both Parliament and the colonial legislatures 
in wresting legal authority from the Crown.  Because of the Framers’ broad 
familiarity with the history of Journal-keeping practice, and its role in 
constitutional development, many of the specifics of the provision were 
borrowed from existing record-keeping traditions with minimal 
disagreement.  The Articles of Confederation contained a provision 
mandating the regular publication of legislative proceedings that served as a 
model.239  So, too, did many state constitutions.240  Debate on the text of the 
new clause thus focused on relatively narrow procedural questions, most of 
 
 237 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 185, at 544–47. 
 238 WOOD, supra note 185, at 404–09 (describing state legislatures’ abuses of authority in the eighteenth 
century); WOOD, supra note 185, at 522–23 (describing the Founders’ fear of similar excesses by 
Congress).   
 239 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. VII, § 7.  
 240 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. I, art. II; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XV; PA. CONST. of 1776, 
§ 14; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV.  States legislatures whose constitutions did not explicitly 
require them to keep journals still did, continuing the colonial practice.  See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA (Samuel Shepard & Co. eds., 1828) (1776), 
https://archive.org/details/journalofhouseof1776virg; see also Early State Records Online, MD. ST. 
ARCHIVES, http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/html/all.html (last 
visited May 1, 2019) (listing archives copies of the Journals of the Maryland Senate and House of 
Delegates from 1777 onward). 
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which focused on ensuring that the Journals were sufficiently succinct.241  
Indeed, perhaps the most significant fact about the Journal Clause of Article I 
is that it was included in the Constitution at all.  No other branch of 
government was similarly required to produce a record of its proceedings. 
Article III, for instance, contains no equivalent mandate that judicial courts 
produce procedural records or publish opinions.  The explicit incorporation 
of a legislative record-keeping requirement into the Constitution’s final text 
reflects the particular importance accorded Journals at the time; an attitude 
that is consistent with the primacy of the legislature in the political theory of 
late eighteenth-century America.242  
Consistent with the goal of empowering Congress to keep and publish its 
own records with minimal external restraints, the Journal Clause also 
loosened restrictions imposed by the Articles of Confederation. The Articles 
had required Congress to publish its proceedings monthly. They had also 
strictly circumscribed the legislature’s power to make redactions: only those 
portions of the legislative record relating to “treaties, alliances or military 
operations” could be withheld.243  Article I eliminated both restrictions: the 
new Congress was required only to publish its proceedings “from time to 
time;” and it could redact any portions of the record which, “in its 
discretion,” required secrecy.244  Unlike other portions of the Journal Clause, 
these changes did inspire controversy, both at the Philadelphia Convention 
and at the state ratifying conventions. George Mason argued that a blanket 
allowance for Congress to withhold portions of its Journals at its own 
discretion would turn the legislature into a “conclave.”245  James Wilson 
likewise argued that the “people have a right to know what their Agents are 
doing or have done,” and that therefore Congress should have no option to 
keep its Journals secret.246  There were also objections in both the Virginia,247 
and the North Carolina ratifying conventions to the absence of a strict 
timetable for publishing records248 Patrick Henry called the “provision for 
periodical publication . . . too inexplicit and ambiguous,” and worried that, 
without a strict mandate to publish their proceedings, Congress could “carry 
on the most wicked and pernicious schemes under the dark veil of secrecy.”249  
The most forceful response to these objections was made by James Madison, 
 
 241 These debates, which focused on questions such as the quorum required to record a vote, are found 
in the published records of the Constitutional Convention. See 2 The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, 256 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).  
 242 See supra Section II.A; see also WOOD, supra note 194, at 162–63. 
 243 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VII, § 7.  
 244 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.  
 245 CHAFETZ, supra note 65, at 52. 
 246 CHAFETZ, supra note 65, at 52. 
 247 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 315–
16 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter Elliot’s Debates]. 
 248 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, 72–73.  
 249 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, at 169–70.  
 
May 2019] REDISCOVERING THE JOURNAL CLAUSE 1265 
who argued during the Virginia ratifying convention that relaxing these 
restrictions merely vested Congress with the same authority as the House of 
Commons and the majority of state legislatures—both of which had wide 
discretion regarding the publication and redaction of their records.250  While 
Madison did not dispute the potential danger of political secrecy—a concern 
that had been raised periodically throughout the drafting and ratification 
process251—he contended that the traditional norms of legislative 
recordkeeping would prevent abuse.  “There was,” he explained, “never any 
legislative assembly without a discretionary power of concealing important 
transactions, the publication of which might be detrimental to the 
community.  There can be no real danger as long as the government is 
constructed on such principles.”252  
But despite the greater discretion it conferred on Congress to compile 
and publish its own records, the Journal Clause also implicitly addressed the 
need to construct a national legislature bound by rules.  In order to ensure 
legislative independence, Article I had granted Congress sole authority over 
several important areas of governance. Section 5, for instance, authorized 
each House to determine the rules of its own proceedings, and to punish or 
expel its members for violations.253  That Section also made Congress the 
judge of its own elections, and the returns and qualifications of its 
members.254  Section 2 permitted each House to choose its Speakers and 
other officers.255  Sections 2 and 3 designated the House of Representatives 
and the Senate as having the sole power to initiate and try impeachments, 
respectively, and also authorized each house to select its own officers.256  
These provisions largely codified rights that Parliament and the colonial 
assemblies had won as a precedential matter by the eighteenth century, after 
extended legal struggles.257  As the attempts of the Stuarts and earlier 
monarchs to manipulate the procedures by which legislation was enacted 
demonstrated, a legislature’s power over the rules of its proceedings was an 
essential element of its political independence.258  Likewise, the role of the 
Crown in selecting Speakers and other legislative officers had long been a 
means of undermining the autonomy of Parliament and American legislative 
 
 250 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, at 409.  
 251 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, at 315–16 (Patrick Henry detailing dangers of political 
secrecy).  
 252 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 247, at 409.  
 253 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cls. 1, 2.  
 254 Id. cl. 1.  
 255 Id. §  2, cl. 5.  
 256 See id. (granting the House of Representatives the “sole Power of Impeachment”); id. § 3, cl. 6 
(granting the Senate the “sole Power to try all Impeachments”).  
 257 See supra Part I.  
 258 See supra Section I.C. 
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assemblies.259  Impeachment was perhaps the most powerful weapon 
legislatures possessed against the “evil ministers” of the Executive.260  
Affirming that Congress had sole authority in these areas was thus essential 
to stabilizing a system of separated powers.  
Yet these functions were also important components of a representative 
democracy.  As Locke and Blackstone had expressed reservations about the 
unlimited sovereignty of Parliament in the eighteenth century, so Americans 
worried that granting Congress unchecked authority to determine the 
process by which laws were made, impeachments were tried, or legislators 
were seated risked permitting the legislature to behave arbitrarily.261  There 
was no black-letter provision of the Constitution that ensured that Congress 
would discharge these duties in a manner that was generally accepted as 
consistent with republican values.  The Journal Clause provided a solution 
to this difficulty, because it continued the well-established English and 
colonial practice of recording and compiling the precedents of legislative 
procedure in a legally binding government record.  And as the Wilkes case 
had recently demonstrated, written precedent could serve not only to 
advance the legislature’s interests against the Crown, but also to ensure that 
the legislature itself remained bounded by legal norms—that, as Locke had 
explained, the “rulers” were “kept within their due bounds.”262  Indeed, as 
legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic had grown more powerful in the 
eighteenth century, ensuring that those bodies were bounded by rules of 
fairness and procedure took on even greater political importance.263  Patrick 
Henry’s fear that Congress might carry on “pernicious schemes” if it were 
not forced to disclose its proceedings, and James Wilson’s demand that the 
public know what its “Agents were doing or have done” reflected an anxiety 
among the founding generation that a legislature unbounded by transparent 
and widely accepted rules of procedure was liable to become abusive.  
The drafters of the Constitution and early legislators considered the 
Journals of the House and Senate to import existing precedents of 
parliamentary law from England and from the colonial assemblies into 
congressional practice.  Thomas Jefferson drafted a manual of legislative 
procedure for the Senate—a version of which governed questions of Senate 
procedure until the 1970s,264 and still governs questions of House 
 
 259 See supra Sections I.A & I.C.  For a discussion of the role gubernatorial patronage played in checking 
the power of colonial legislatures, see BAILYN, supra note 211, at 72–80. 
 260 See supra Sections I.A & I.C. 
 261 For a discussion of anxieties about legislative supremacy in the colonial and early republican era, 
see 3 REID, supra note 194, at 71–84, 301; WOOD, supra note 194, at 404–09. 
 262 LOCKE, supra note 190, at 72–73. 
 263 WOOD, supra note 194, at 404–09 (describing state legislatures’ abuses of authority in the eighteenth 
century).  
 264 JEFFERSON, supra note 224, at xiii–xiv. 
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procedure265 for issues on which it has not been explicitly superseded—that 
structured much of the institution’s early rules, and that was adopted almost 
entirely from Hatsell’s compendium of precedents from parliamentary 
Journals.266  The surviving writings of John James Beckley, the influential first 
Clerk of the House of Representatives and a confidant of Jefferson, likewise 
indicate a belief that Congress would be governed by the history of 
parliamentary practice.  Beckley was well read in the major treatises on 
British parliamentary procedure, including Coke and Hatsell,267 and in an 
unpublished treatise on legislative procedure he reviewed “the jurisdiction & 
power of Parliament” in order to derive the “general principles” of legislative 
law, and apply them to “the specified & enumerated powers of Congress” 
and “the general nature and design of those Legislative and judicial functions 
with the execution of which, it is entrusted, as the supreme power of the 
Union.”268  
In addition, the Journals provided the means for Congress to adopt new 
precedents where prior practice did not provide adequate guidance.  Both 
the House and the Senate understood that the proceedings recorded in their 
Journals would themselves assume precedential effect on disputed questions 
of procedure.269 The establishment of a fixed system of rules lent order and 
legitimacy to congressional proceedings.  Like Parliament, both Houses of 
Congress directed their clerical staff to take special care to ensure their 
 
 265 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 114-192, at 1030–31 (2015); see also 
id. at 127 n.1 (noting that Jefferson’s Manual has controlled House procedure unless explicitly 
contradicted since 1837).  The House version omits portions of the Manual that refer exclusively to 
Senate or procedure or the procedures of Parliament.  Id.  
 266 JEFFERSON, supra note 224, at xxviii.  
 267 JOHN JAMES BECKLEY, JUSTIFYING JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN JAMES 
BECKLEY 142–46 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1995) (recounting Beckley essay referencing British 
parliamentary procedure); see also Edmund S. Berkeley & Dorothy S. Berkeley, “The Ablest Clerk in 
the U.S.”: John James Beckley, 70 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 434, 436 (1962) (discussing Beckley’s 
early English legal education); Noble E. Cunningham, John Beckley: An Early American Party Manager, 
13 WM. & MARY Q. 40, 40 (1956) (discussing Beckley’s experience as a clerk in various legislatures). 
 268 BECKLEY, supra note 267, at 144. 
 269 The use of record precedents to resolve disputes of procedure has continued to the present day. 
Former Clerk Asher Hinds, in his definitive treatment of procedure in the House of Representatives 
in 1907, wrote in the introduction to his treatise that “[t]he value of precedents in guiding the action 
of a legislative body had been demonstrated by the experience of the House of Representatives for 
too many years to justify any arguments in their favor now.”  ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ 
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES iii (1907); see also 6 
CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v (1935) 
(recognizing the influence of Hinds’ Precedents).  The Senate’s compendium of procedure, written 
by former Parliamentarian Floyd Riddck, likewise relies on Journal precedent to articulate many 
of the rules of legislative practice.  See FLOYD M. RIDDICK, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: 
PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES xv (Alan S. Frumin ed., 1992) (“These rulings and opinions extend 
over a long period of time and were made by many different Presiding Officers-some going back 
almost to the very first session of the Senate.  The Senate portions of the Congressional Record and the 
Senate Journal, for the period from December 3, 1883, to date, have been perused for rulings by 
Presiding Officers and practices which relate to Senate procedure.”). 
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accuracy.  Journal entries could be made or changed only at the formal 
direction of the relevant house, and their contents were strictly controlled.270  
By providing a formal mechanism by which the legislature could both consult 
historical precedent, and, where necessary, establish new legal and 
procedural rules, Journals lent structure to an area of government that the 
Constitution had left underdetermined. 
C.  Journals in the Early Republic 
Legal historians in recent decades have revived the study of the early 
republican theory of constitutional interpretation known as 
“departmentalism.”271  The Founding generation anticipated that where an 
ambiguity existed in constitutional doctrine, all three federal departments 
(and, under some versions of this theory, the states as well) would participate 
in constructing governing precedent. The courts enjoyed no legal monopoly 
on constitutional interpretation.  As James Madison asserted in 1789:  
“[There is no ‘one department’ that] draws from the constitution greater 
powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of the several 
departments. . . . If the constitutional boundary of either be brought into 
 
 270 The Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate was “the sworn recording officer of the 
assembly,” and, like the Clerks of Parliament who were forbidden from making entries at the 
entreaties of individual legislators, was “subject only to the control of the assembly itself, and not to 
the control of the presiding officer, or of any other member.”  See LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, 
LEX PARLIAMENTIA AMERICANA: ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 169 (2d ed. 1859). House rules specifically 
charged that “clerk is to let no journals, records, accounts, or papers be taken from the table, or out 
of his custody.”  JEFFERSON, supra note 224, at 25.  This care ensured that Congress’s records, and 
the constitutional precedents reflected in them, would command respect from both the public and 
the coordinate branches of government.  In contrast to emerging newspaper reports of legislative 
debates, which often provided detailed transcriptions of floor speeches, the contents of the Journals 
were intentionally spare. See infra Part III (describing the rise of the transcripts of debate in the early 
nineteenth century, and their eventual displacement of the Journals as the preeminent records of 
legislative activity).  They recorded only the votes, attendance, resolutions, and official messages 
exchanged by either house— the official acts undertaken by the House and Senate as collective 
bodies, which could be used by the institutions as precedent for future institutional conduct.  
 271 See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 108–11 (2004) (describing the “departmental theory” of the early Republic, in which 
“[e]ach branch could express its views as issues came before it in the ordinary course of business . . 
. [b]ut none of the branches’ views were final or authoritative”); see also LOUIS FISHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988) (arguing that 
“constitutional law is not a monopoly of the judiciary,” but rather “a process in which all three 
branches con-verge and interact with their separate interpretations”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 232–33  (1994) 
(describing the belief, articulated in the Federalist Papers, that “one-branch interpretative 
supremacy” was undesirable, and that “each department should have a will of its own” by “being 
made independent of other departments”); Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Authority 
of the Judiciary’s Interpretation of the Constitution, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 771, 777 (1994) (noting that 
“executive officials” have “frequently advocated departmentalism as opposed to judicial 
supremacy” from “the earliest days of the republic until the present day”). 
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question, I do not see that any one of these independent departments has 
more right than another to declare their sentiments on that point.”272 
While courts asserted the right to review statutes and other state actions 
for constitutionality, they exercised this jurisdiction only rarely in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.273  Moreover, even when courts 
did interpret the constitution, they rarely espoused the more radical doctrine 
of judicial supremacy, i.e., that judicial interpretations were binding on other 
departments.274  In the ordinary course of government, the early Constitution 
relied on multiple institutional interpreters to give it construction.  
Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of what these 
non-judicial constitutional interpretations looked like in daily practice, how 
they were formulated, and what legal authority they had.  The history of 
legislative Journals demonstrates that constitutional interpretation by the 
coordinate branches was more than a theoretical possibility in the early years 
of the republic.  Republicans in particular emphasized the importance of 
Congress, viewing constitutional interpretation by an elective assembly as an 
important corrective to the aristocratic and centralizing impulses of the 
judicially-oriented Federalists.275  As John Randolph of Virginia protested 
during the debate to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801, “are we [in Congress] 
not as deeply interested in the true exposition of the Constitution as the 
judges can be?  With all the deference to their talents, is not Congress as 
capable of forming a correct opinion as they are?”276  The pre-1787 history 
of legislative records provided a ready-made framework for Congress to 
deliberate upon questions of law, and to build an authoritative body of 
precedent.  Congress not only had an equal right to interpret the 
Constitution, it also had an array of well-established, time-tested institutional 
tools with which to do so.  The records that it managed as part of its daily 
proceedings allowed it to register its interpretations of constitutional law, and 
to respond to the interpretations asserted by other branches, as both 
Parliament and the colonial assemblies had done before it. 
Indeed, because of the active role that legislatures had historically played 
in contributing to constitutional doctrine, not only Congress but the other 
branches considered legislative constitutionalism to be a natural feature of 
the tripartite system of government.  Competing interpretations of 
constitutional law, memorialized in parallel government records, could lead 
to the sorts of procedural disputes that characterized seventeenth century 
England and colonial American politics.  But in the ordinary course of early 
 
 272 KRAMER, supra note 195, at 105–06. 
 273 KRAMER, supra note 195, at 147–48 (discussing how rarely judicial review was implemented). 
 274 KRAMER, supra note 195, at 150–60 (recounting the rocky beginnings of judicial supremacy). 
 275 KRAMER, supra note 195, at 141–42 (comparing Federalist and Republican views on judicial 
review). 
 276 KRAMER, supra note 195, at 143. 
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republican government, departmental interpretations of the constitution 
were often complimentary rather than conflicting.  Congress, for instance, 
took care in its early records to memorialize its respect for the prerogatives 
of other branches.  In 1806, William Smith, an admiral and Revolutionary 
War veteran, and Samuel G. Ogden, a New York ship owner, submitted an 
unusual petition to Congress.  Ogden and Smith had been arrested for 
violation of the 1794 Neutrality Act277 after Smith had been captured by the 
Spanish Navy while bound for Venezuela with men and weapons on a ship 
owned by Ogden.  The men claimed that they had been secretly encouraged 
by President Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison to provide 
assistance to Francisco de Miranda in his war for independence against 
Spain, charges which Jefferson and Madison denied.278  
While their prosecution was pending in New York, they submitted a 
petition to Congress alleging that they had been acting under executive 
orders from the President and “praying such relief [ ] as the wisdom of 
Congress might think proper to grant.”279  A number of congressmen viewed 
the petition as an attempt to implicate the President in a secret military plot 
on the Journals of Congress, and as an improper request for Congress to 
interfere in an ongoing trial.  Nathan Williams of New York claimed that the 
petitions were an attempt, “by obtaining the sanction of the House of their 
contents, to throw blame and censure on the prosecutors.” 280  The petitions, 
claimed Williams, were “of a most dangerous tendency” both because they 
implied the possibility of Congress interfering in a judicial proceeding, and 
because they would “tend to incense not only the country against the 
Administration, but against the tribunals of justice.”281  After a lengthy 
debate, the House entered a resolution declaring that the memorials were 
“presented at a time and under circumstances insidiously calculated to excite 
unjust prejudice . . . against the existing Administration,” and thus directing 
“that the said memorials be by the Clerk of this House returned to those from 
whom they came” and expunged from the Journals.282  The resolution thus 
adopted the ancient parliamentary practice of expurgation—of annulling the 
precedential effect of a Journal entry—in order to ensure that Congress’s 
records accurately reflected the constitutional boundaries between the 
coordinate branches.  
 
 
 
 
 277 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1994). 
 278 See generally United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). 
 279 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 1086 (1806). 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id.  The resolution passed by a large margin.  Id. at 1094. 
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Similar instances in which Congress omitted or erased entries thought to 
impugn the prerogatives of other departments occurred throughout the early 
republican era.  In 1818, for instance, Vincente Pazos, who purported to be 
an agent of the governments of Mexico and Venezuela, submitted a petition 
to Congress seeking compensation for property damage suffered by 
inhabitants of Amelia Island, which had recently been annexed by the 
United States.  The Executive had already rejected similar requests and had 
not yet formally recognized either government.  The House of 
Representatives voted to refuse to receive the petition, as it appeared to be a 
request for Congress to grant implicit recognition on its formal records to 
governments that the Executive had not yet recognized, and also to reverse 
an Executive decision on compensating foreign nationals.  As John Rhea of 
Tennessee summarized, “[t]he Constitution had given this business to the 
Executive—this House had nothing to do with it; and he did not wish to 
encourage appeals, either to the people or this House, from the Executive by 
any foreign agent.”283  In instances such as these, Congress utilized its 
Journals not to wrest power from coordinate branches, but to formally 
reaffirm its respect for their constitutional prerogatives, establishing the 
comity necessary for departmental interpretation to function properly.  
Courts, in turn, recognized Congress’s authority to reason as a law-
interpreting body.  The most significant example of this dynamic was the 
recognition of Congress’s right to hold non-members in contempt.  The 
congressional power of contempt, which is not explicitly granted by Article I, 
is traditionally traced to the Supreme Court’s holding in Anderson v. Dunn in 
1821.284  But while Anderson did recognize Congress’s inherent power to 
punish contempt, this recognition was not so much a legal innovation as an 
adoption of existing constitutional doctrine established by congressional 
precedent.  Parliament had exercised the right to hold non-members in 
contempt, as had most colonial and state legislatures.285  Congress first 
asserted the same authority in 1795, when members of the House of 
Representatives accused two private citizens, Robert Randall and Charles 
Whitney, of attempting to bribe them in exchange for land development 
rights in Michigan.286  The House, at the urging of William Smith of South 
 
 283 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1258 (1818).  
 284 19 U.S. 204, 204 (1821).  For modern authorities tracing the power of contempt to Anderson, see for 
example, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 216 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing 
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. at 204) (“The power of the Congress to punish for contempt of its authority 
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contempt as a criminal offense punishable by judicial process.  See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 216 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting this enactment).  
 285 See CHAFETZ, supra note 72, at 193–206 (providing a history of the use of contempt powers and the 
theories supporting their use). 
 286 See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 166–95 (1795) (providing an account of Congressional action taken in 
response to bribery attempts). 
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Carolina, resolved to formally claim the ancient parliamentary prerogative 
for itself.  Smith explained:  
As every jurisdiction had certain powers necessary for its preservation, so the 
Legislature possessed certain privileges incident to its nature, and essential 
for its very existence.  This is called in England the parliamentary law; and 
as from that law are derived the usages and proceedings of the several State 
Legislatures, so will the proceedings of this House be generally guided by the 
long-established usages of the State Legislatures.287   
Smith urged that Congress use its Journals to define the laws and 
procedures governing its right of contempt, since neither the Constitution 
nor the courts could supply the proper guidance.  “This was the first instance, 
since the organization of this Government,” Smith noted, “in which it had 
been found necessary to resort to this high prerogative: it was right, therefore, 
that the principles on which it was founded should be well understood, and 
that the privileges of the House should stand unimpaired.”288  The 
Committee on Privileges thus drafted a resolution, voted by the House, 
which formally defined the mode of proceeding for the trial.289  Throughout, 
the Journals served as the equivalent of a court record, listing formal charges 
devised by the Committee on Privileges, as well as pleas, testimony, and the 
judgment of the House.290  
When John Anderson, likewise accused of attempted bribery, stood trial 
for contempt in 1818, the House of Representatives relied heavily on the 
precedent of Randall and Whitney to prosecute the case.  The procedures 
employed in 1795 were closely replicated.291  When several Republican 
congressmen attacked the proceedings as unconstitutional, Federalists 
replied that that the Congress had already considered and rejected these 
arguments and established its right to hold non-members in contempt as a 
matter of precedent.  Joseph Hopkinson of Pennsylvania encapsulated the 
Federalist position, explaining that the Republicans’ objection “had been 
heretofore solemnly debated and adjudged; and all the objections now 
expressed had been brought forward in their greatest force, without effect; 
and the precedent then established was entitled to respect.”292  In the case of 
Randall and Whitney, “it was well known a full opportunity was given for 
the freest discussion; the parties arraigned at the bar having been heard by 
their counsel on this question.”293  “In such cases,” Hopkinson concluded, 
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 289 Id. at 194–95. 
 290 See id. at 166–95 (listing specific charges brought by the Committee on Privileges). 
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charges and defining the mode of proceeding. Its contents substantially reproduced the procedure 
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“we have ever been guided by precedent, and we have done right.”294  
Charles Mercer of Virginia gave an even more forceful defense of the power 
of Congressional precedent.  Mercer said: 
It has been correctly said that the multiplicity of laws constitutes the security 
of the citizen.  So, sir, does the multitude of precedents which, sanctioned by 
usage, operate with the force of law. Precedents established in good times, 
stay, in disastrous days, the rage of faction, and the hand of tyranny . . . .295   
Even Republicans opposed to the congressional power of contempt 
appeared to acknowledge the force of the Whitney and Randall precedent—
rather than urging the Congress to ignore it, several encouraged Congress to 
explicitly overrule it instead.  “If solitary precedents might be found on the 
Journals of the exercise of such a power by the House,” urged Philemon 
Beecher of Ohio, “it was time now to put a stop to it.” 296 
When Anderson brought a trespass action against the Sergeant at Arms 
of the House of Representatives for detaining him in connection with his 
contempt proceeding (arguing that the detention was not authorized by law, 
because Congress had no constitutionally sanctioned power to punish 
contempt), he was in effect asking the court to overrule twenty years of settled 
congressional precedent, which was based in turn on several centuries of 
parliamentary practice.  Much as Ogden or Pazos had done in Congress, 
Anderson was asking the judiciary to invade the long-established prerogative 
of a coordinate branch of government.  The Supreme Court rejected 
Anderson’s arguments, and in doing so employed reasoning that closely 
mirrored that of Congress.  It was true, the court conceded, that the 
Constitution did not grant Congress the express power to punish contempt. 
“But what,” the Court asked, “is the alternative? The argument obviously 
leads to the total annihilation of the power of the House of Representatives 
to guard itself from contempts, and leaves it exposed to every indignity and 
interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against 
it.”297  In response to Anderson’s argument that neither the Constitution nor 
the coordinate branches provided any limitation on the contempt power, and 
that as a result it was liable to be abused, the court replied that this was not 
so.  Congress’s power to punish was subject to limits—specifically, the limits 
of precedent and legal reasoning. Congress could not stretch its authority to 
punish beyond reason, because it was required to reason publicly and 
accountable to the public for its judgments.  The Court replied:  
That a deliberate assembly clothed with the majesty of the people, and 
charged with the care of all that is dear to them . . . whose deliberations are 
required by public opinion to be conducted under the eye of the public, and 
 
 294 Id.  
 295 Id. at 642. 
 296 Id. at 606. 
 297 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228 (1821). 
 
1274 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:5 
whose decisions must be clothed with all that sanctity which unlimited 
confidence in their wisdom and purity can inspire, that such an assembly 
should not possess the power to suppress rudeness, or repel insult, is a 
supposition too wild to be suggested.298 
And these judgments were not to made from whole cloth.  Rather, they 
were to be derived (legally, analogically) from the powers established by long 
usage, as revealed by the legislature’s records.  The Court concluded: 
[T]he Constitution is not a new creation, but a combination of existing 
materials, whose properties and attributes were familiarly understood, and 
had been determined by reiterated experiments. It is not, therefore, 
reasoning upon things as they are, to suppose that any deliberative assembly, 
constituted under it, would ever assert any other rights and powers than 
those which had been established by long practice, and conceded by public 
opinion.299 
In short, the Court viewed Congress’s building of institutional law as 
legitimate and complementary to the work of the judiciary—as establishing 
reasoned government in areas of law where early courts rarely tread—rather 
than as an intrusion on judicial power or civil liberty.  
The tradition of legislative constitutionalism reached the height of its 
development in the 1830s.  While legislative Journals were important tools 
in elucidating the contours of sovereign power, their contents were rarely 
subject to the kind of bitter controversy that could capture the attention of 
the entire legal or political community.  Such disputes only occurred in times 
of crisis when structural constitutional norms were challenged, and they 
threw into sharp relief the usually hidden or subtle role that legislatures 
played in constructing constitutional doctrine.  The English Civil War was 
one such period in history of the English Journals.  The 1830s was another 
for the Journals of Congress.  During that decade, a series of conflicts over 
issues ranging from nullification to slavery to the limits of Executive power 
and Article I jurisdiction quickly escalated to the verge of political crisis.  
Some of these disputes—nullification, for instance—played out as battles 
between the states and the national government, but others were fought 
within the federal government itself.300  In the era before the advent of 
judicial supremacy, the federal courts were not always the only—or even the 
most natural—department to resolve disputed points of constitutional law.  
Under these circumstances, parties turned to the political branches for 
formal, legal resolution.  Two such disputes are of particular relevance here, 
because they demonstrate the legal community’s consciousness of the 
importance of formal legislative records as law-making documents through 
the 1830s, as well as the continued vitality of formal record-keeping practices 
as a method of constitutional adjudication: (1) the dispute between President 
Jackson and the Senate over the right of the President to intentionally defund 
 
 298 Id. at 228–29. 
 299 Id. at 232. 
 300 KRAMER, supra note 195, at 178–82 (providing a summary of the criticism of judicial supremacy). 
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the Second Bank of the United States; and (2) the dispute over the authority 
of Congress to abolish slavery in federal territories.  
1.  Andrew Jackson and the “Bank War” 
President Jackson’s opposition to the Second Bank of the United States, 
which he believed to be an unconstitutional abuse of Congress’s legislating 
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, is well-
documented.301  So, too, is his belief that each branch of government enjoyed 
a co-equal right to execute the law according to its own interpretation of the 
Constitution.302  These two components of Jackson’s political worldview 
intersected in a bitter confrontation with Congress in 1832 over the re-
chartering of the bank.  The bank’s 1816 federal charter was scheduled to 
expire in 1836.  Jackson’s opponents in Congress—chief among them Henry 
Clay—had gathered enough support in both houses to pass a bill renewing 
the bank’s charter that year, four years ahead of schedule and early enough 
to place the bank at issue during Jackson’s reelection campaign.  Congress 
enacted the re-charter, forcing Jackson to either veto a widely popular 
institution, which the Supreme Court had already declared in McCulloch v. 
Maryland303 to be within the permissible scope of Congress’s Article I powers, 
or sign the bill, surrendering on a key policy platform.  Jackson vetoed it 
nonetheless.  In doing so, he issued arguably the most famous veto message 
in American history, outlining his belief that he was constitutionally obligated 
to veto the bank notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in 
McCulloch.304  Following his reelection in 1832, Jackson took the more 
aggressive step of defunding the bank before its charter expired.  He ordered 
Treasury Secretary Louis McLane to remove its deposits and transfer them 
to various state-chartered institutions.  When McLane refused, believing that 
he was not authorized to do so under the terms of the charter, Jackson 
summarily removed him from office, and replaced him with William Duane, 
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who likewise refused to carry out the order.  Jackson ultimately appointed 
Roger Taney, who finalized the removals.305  
Jackson’s enemies in the Senate viewed these orders as patently 
unconstitutional.  Jackson’s unvarnished defiance of both Congress and the 
judiciary, and his direct appeal to the electorate for popular legitimacy, 
seemed to confirm many of his critics’ long-held suspicion that the President 
was a demagogue who held the republican system in contempt.  Clay warned 
that the nation was “in the midst of a revolution,” in which the political 
system was “rapidly advancing to a concentration of all the powers of 
Government in one man,” and that under the broad Executive authority 
assumed by Jackson “the powers of Congress are paralyzed, except where 
they are in compliance with his own will.”306  But what came to be known as 
the “Bank War” raised more specific constitutional disputes as well.  First, 
Jackson appeared to renege unilaterally on what had previously been settled 
constitutional doctrine concerning the authority of Congress to charter a 
bank.  He also appeared to violate a clear congressional mandate in the 
Bank’s charter concerning the security of federal deposits.307  In addition, 
Jackson’s decision to remove two Secretaries of the Treasury within the space 
of four months for refusing to obey a presidential order revived a debate over 
the presidential removal power that had recurred periodically since 1789.308  
While Article II provided a procedure for the President to appoint executive 
officers, it had never specified a process for removal.  Congress had 
thoroughly debated the question of whether to impose strict limits on 
removal in 1789, but had never settled on a final resolution, leaving the 
constitutional question open to future articulation.309   
 
 
 
 305 For a description of the events of the Bank War, see Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God 
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Jackson’s allies controlled the House of Representatives, which removed 
impeachment as a possibility.  But his opponents in the Senate still hoped to 
deal the President a political defeat, and more importantly to place on the 
public record their objection to his expansive interpretation of Executive 
power.  They opted instead to vote a formal resolution censuring the 
President, and declaring that “the President, in the late Executive 
proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself 
authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in 
derogation of both.”310  Jackson immediately protested the censure as itself 
unconstitutional, arguing that it constituted a procedurally improper 
“impeachment” by only one house of Congress, or, in the alternative, an 
impermissible bill of attainder declaring him “guilty” of violating his oath of 
office.311  For Jackson, the dispute was not merely a question of personal 
pride.  If the legal judgment of the Senate were permitted to remain, 
uncontested, on its official records, Jackson feared that he would be deemed 
to have acquiesced in a highly restrictive reading of Executive power—a 
reading that, in a tripartite system of constitutional interpretation, could 
acquire the status of legal precedent.  Thus, in the closing paragraph of his 
message, the President made formal disagreement unambiguous:   
To the end that the resolution of the Senate may not be hereafter drawn into 
precedent,” he concluded, “with the authority of silent acquiescence on the 
part of the executive department; and to the end, also, that my motives and 
views in the executive proceedings denounced in that resolution may be 
known to my fellow-citizens, to the world, and to all posterity, respectfully 
request that this message and protest be entered at length on the Journals of 
the Senate.312  
The Senate, unwilling to compromise the exclusive control of their 
records, or to weaken the legal force of their condemnation, determined that 
Jackson’s protest of the censure, and his demand that it be printed in the 
Senate Journal, constituted an invasion of legislative privilege.313  They voted 
on May 6, 1834 to refuse to receive the message, and to expunge all 
references to it from the Journals.314  Soon after its passage, Jackson in turn 
began rallying his allies in the Senate to expunge the censure from the 
Journal.  The same day that the President’s message was returned, Thomas 
Hart Benton of Missouri, a staunch Jacksonian, invoked the House of 
Commons’ resolution banning John Wilkes—which, after fourteen years of 
agitation, “was judged and condemned, for adopting a resolution which was 
held by the subjects of the British Crown to be a violation of their 
Constitution, and a subversion of the rights of Englishmen”— and vowed to 
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the Senate that he would not rest until its censure was formally removed from 
the Journal.315  He was ultimately successful, and the resolution was 
expunged in 1837.316 
The dispute over Jackson’s censure and its expurgation has perplexed 
modern historians. The debates consumed a considerable amount of time, 
effort, and political capital. To contemporary lawyers, the years-long fight 
over the formal constitutional judgment of the Senate on Jackson’s conduct 
and on the limits of Executive power appears to be little more than an 
exercise in partisan combat. As one commentator has argued, the resolution 
acted merely as nonbinding commentary on a controversial policy debate.  
In adopting it, the Senate was “filling a well-established role—and nothing 
more . . . . By approving this resolution senators simply recounted the events 
as they saw them and noted their disagreement with the legality of the 
President’s actions, leaving it to others—historians, the American people—
to determine Jackson’s fate, and the state of his honor.”317  As another puts 
it:  
The shouting match over the rights of the President and the Senate to 
comment on one another’s actions . . . ended pretty much in a draw. . . . 
Federal officers of all types habitually sound off on topics unrelated to their 
substantive authority, and nobody tends to complain; we are wont to dismiss 
the release of hot air as not rising to the level of an exercise of power.318   
But such assessments of the censure episode do not appreciate the 
important role that official legislative records played in constitutional 
construction until well into the nineteenth century.  In the 1830s, the Senate’s 
formal judgment on the legality of the President’s actions still represented a 
precedential interpretation of the scope of Executive authority.  This was 
President Jackson’s primary reason for attacking the resolution.  Jackson was 
one of the most aggressive expositors of departmentalism, and his veto 
message defending his decision to refuse to re-charter the bank is still 
considered among the most significant expressions of that interpretative 
theory.319   
Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears 
that he will support it as he understands it,” the President argued, “and not 
as it is understood by others. . . . The opinion of the judges has no more 
authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, 
and on that point the President is independent of both.320   
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But Jackson understood the constitutional judgments of Congress to be 
of equal significance to those of the Executive.321  Jackson’s insistence that 
the Senate expunge his censure was similarly framed as a demand that the 
body correct an interpretative error on its record books. In his 1834 protest, 
Jackson argued:  
When the chief Executive Magistrate is by one of the most important 
branches of the Government, in its official capacity, in a public manner, and 
by its recorded sentence, but without precedent, competent authority, or just 
cause, declared guilty of a breach of the laws and Constitution, it is due to 
his station, to public opinion, and to a proper self-respect, that the officer 
denounced should promptly expose the wrong which has been done.”322  
Jackson’s opponents in the Senate—who by the Twenty-Fourth Congress 
had lost their majority—resisted the President’s call for expurgation by 
arguing that such a resolution would violate the injunction of the Journal 
Clause itself.  This dubious argument rested on a restrictive reading of the 
Clause’s text.  Defenders of the censure argued that to erase it would be to 
violate the requirement that the Senate “keep” a Journal of its proceedings.  
John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, Jackson’s former Vice President and 
now bitter rival, was particularly outspoken in pressing this interpretation.  
Calhoun argued: 
[The word keep is] of the most comprehensive meaning, and, at the same 
time, free from all ambiguity . . . . It implies that our proceedings shall be 
fully and accurately recorded, and, when so recorded, and, when so 
recorded, that the journal containing them shall be carefully protected and 
preserved . . . discharge this obligation, we are bound, not only to abstain 
from destroying, altering, or in any respect injuring the journals ourselves.323  
There was little textual or historical support for this literalist reading of 
the Journal Clause, but Calhoun argued that it most closely reflected the 
privileged place the Journals held as official legislative records:  
The impression that they are our journals and that we may do with them as 
we please, is the result of a gross misconception.  They indeed contain an 
account of our proceedings, but they belong not to us.  They are the property 
of the public. They belong to the people of these confederated States; and 
we have no more right to injure, alter, or destroy them, than the stranger 
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that walks the streets; no more than we have to alter or destroy the journal 
of the other House, or the records of the courts of justice.324 
Jackson’s allies had not only the votes to expunge the censure, but the 
stronger arguments as well.  They agreed that Article I imposed a duty on 
the legislature to keep faithful records but insisted that expurgation was 
entirely consistent with both the history and the purpose of the Journal 
Clause.  In a sprawling speech recounting the history of English and 
American Journals, Benton noted that both Parliament and Congress had 
historically allowed the amendment or erasure of Journal entries.  He cited 
the ancient parliamentary practice of ordering corrections on the Journals 
for the proposition “the business of rectifying mistakes or erroneous entries 
in the Journals is as old as the Journals themselves.”325  He referred to the 
Attainder of Strafford as well, declaring:  
I have seen no instance in which the duty to keep a Journal of its proceedings 
has been set up in opposition to any motion to expunge unfit matter from 
the Journal; and therefore I hold it to be the settled law of Parliament that 
each House has power over its own Journal, both to correct it, and to efface 
objectionable matter from it.326   
Benton also cited the case of Ogden’s petition as an American precedent, 
noting that they were excised from the Journals because they were 
“presented by the political enemies of Mr. Jefferson, and so far as they 
received the support or countenance, it was from the ranks of the 
Opposition.”327  The Senate’s denunciation of Jackson, like the attempt to 
implicate Jefferson in a military plot, was an act of “[p]arty warfare,” and 
now “the same party spirit, and the same party—the bank federal party, 
which in 1806, wished to have its charges against President Jefferson 
transferred from the newspapers to the Journals of Congress, thence to be 
transmitted to posterity as a part of the legislative history of the country” had 
condemned Jackson on the Journals as well.328    
This history, Benton continued, revealed the true intent behind the 
Clause’s mandate that Congress “keep” a record of its proceedings.  It did 
not require that either house maintain a static administrative history of its 
decisions.  Rather, it incorporated the ancient tradition whereby both 
English and American legislatures produced and amended an evolving 
account of their constitutional judgments.  For Benton, who believed in the 
constitutionality of Jackson’s transfer of the deposits and his removal of the 
Secretary of the Treasury (twice), the presence on the Journals of a resolution 
condemning the President was itself an error that required correction.  “The 
right to expunge,” he claimed “rests upon the right to keep the Journal clear 
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of what ought never to be upon it.  It rests upon the right to purify it from 
anything improper, which inadvertence, mistake, or the injustice, virulence, 
and fury of party spirit may have put upon it.”329  As had happened so many 
times before in the history of the Journals, the question of when and how a 
legislative body could correct “errors” on its records morphed from a 
secretarial one to a political and constitutional one.  As a logical corollary, 
Benton argued that allowing the resolution to remain on the Journals was 
itself an affirmative act—by not expunging the record, the Senate was 
implicitly endorsing it.  The Constitution, thus, did not require the Senate to 
“preserve” the record, it required the Senate to expunge the record as an 
incorrect judgment on the constitutionality of a presidential act, to “correct” 
it as the Cavalier Parliament had “corrected” the Attainder of Strafford.  
Likewise, the purpose of these erasures was not to misrepresent the 
history of legislative sittings, but to amend and revise the judgments reflected 
on Congress’s records. Thus, Jackson’s censure—like Strafford’s attainder—
would not be obscured from the physical pages of the Journal books, but 
circumscribed and crossed out; in other words, symbolically erased to 
represent the Senate’s revision of its previous resolution.  He claimed:  
Nothing is suppressed, nothing so insane is intended.  The whole effect, the 
whole design of the  motion, is to declare the solemn sense of the Senate that 
such proceed ings ought never to have taken place; that they were wrong 
from the  beginning, and require a remedy which extirpates to the root.  The 
order  to expunge does this, and there is no other remedy which can amount 
to its equivalent, or stand for its substitute.330  
The purpose of the expurgation was not to erase the fact of the resolution, 
but to declare that it had been wrong.  
2.  Petitions Against Slavery 
The second example of the prominent role legislative Journals played in 
constitutional construction in the 1830s is the decade-long controversy over 
Congress’s receipt of citizen petitions demanding the abolition of slavery in 
federal territories, including the District of Columbia.  In 1831, a group of 
Pennsylvania abolitionists submitted petitions to the House of 
Representatives, which John Quincy Adams introduced, requesting that the 
House abolish both slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia—
an act arguably within its power, as the District was under the jurisdiction of 
the federal government.  In the coming years, the number of petitions 
demanding federal action on slavery swelled to a flood.331  Like the Senate’s 
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censure of President Jackson, the slavery petitions addressed a question on 
which Article I was ambiguous, and which courts had consistently failed to 
resolve: What precisely was the extent of Congress’s authority to regulate or 
restrict slavery, particularly in federal territories?332 The legislative and 
executive branches, too, had avoided the debate, preferring to compromise 
rather than risk political crisis.333 The organized petition campaign was an 
attempt to force the issue to a resolution through popular pressure.  Also like 
the Senate’s censure of Jackson, the petition campaign transformed into a 
multi-year political conflict due to a dispute over a seemingly minor point of 
legislative procedure. Petitions seeking the partial or total abolition of slavery 
had been presented sporadically to Congress since the beginning of the 
republic.334 In response, the slave states had established a fixed procedure for 
suppressing any floor debate on the issue. The petitions would be received 
but referred to Southern-dominated committees who would either report 
adversely on them or simply refuse to report on them at all. When the most 
recent wave of petitions was presented in the 1830s, this strategy was revived 
and public controversy over the issue was largely contained.335 But in 1836, 
Senator Calhoun and Representative John C. Hammond in the House, both 
among the most prominent defenders of slaveholding interests, insisted on a 
new and more radical procedural approach. Rather than simply tabling the 
abolitionist petitions, Calhoun and Hammond proposed that Southern 
legislators impose a rule that would prevent the Congress from receiving 
them at all.336 
The result was a political debacle for the South. The rule change was 
never enacted in the Senate, and was implemented for a time in the House 
only to be decisively repealed in 1844.337  Moreover, even if this “gag rule,” 
as it came to be called, had been successful it would have done little to stem 
congressional debate on slavery: The petitions were already excluded from 
floor debate, while legislators were free to raise the issue themselves 
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regardless.338  And in advocating it, Calhoun alienated a key group of 
moderate allies in free states.  These legislators had been happy to let anti-
slavery petitions languish in committee because they felt little support for 
abolitionists, and preferred to focus their attention on more immediately 
profitable legislative programs such as internal improvements.339  But the 
refusal to receive abolitionist petitions appeared to infringe on the First 
Amendment’s protection of citizens’ right to petition for a redress of 
grievances.  “If,” as James Buchanan, then a Senator from Pennsylvania, 
argued, “the people have a right to command, it is the duty of their servants 
to obey . . . . If the people have a right to petition their representatives, it is 
our duty to receive their petition.”340  While the Congress could refuse to 
debate petitions under its authority to control the rules of its own 
proceedings, many congressmen believed that the Petition Clause required 
each house to receive the documents in the first instance.  A perceived 
violation of this protection would have been widely unpopular in the early 
republic, when access to the legislative process still held practical as well as 
theoretical importance.  Ordinary citizens relied on formal petitions to 
Congress to receive critical forms of public assistance, and to promote locally 
significant bills.341   
Because Calhoun’s proposal would have had a minimal impact on the 
slavery debates, and because it left the pro-slavery caucus weaker and more 
isolated than it had been before, historians have largely treated it as a 
perplexing tactical error.  David Currie, in his four-volume history of 
constitutional debate in Congress prior to the Civil War, calls the move 
“singularly stupid,”342 and concludes:  
[I]f Calhoun and his acolytes were looking for a feud, they got what they 
wanted.  They succeeded in making enemies of a great many people, in and 
out of Congress, who had no thought of abolishing slavery in the District or 
anywhere else.  For they managed to turn what had been the quixotic 
crusade of a despised and miniscule abolitionist minority into a broad-based 
defense of the right to petition.343   
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But, as with modern assessments of Jackson’s censure, such accounts do 
not fully appreciate the constitutional importance of legislative formalities in 
the era and so fail to understand Calhoun’s motives.  The courts’ increasing 
reluctance to intervene in the slavery debate had lent the actions of the 
political branches greater constitutional significance than ever.  In the 
absence of an affirmative judicial resolution on Congress’s authority to limit 
slavery, stakeholders expected that constitutional doctrine would be derived, 
as it always had been, from the records of the official acts of the coordinate 
branches.344  
Calhoun was concerned about the damaging optics of allowing attacks 
on slavery in floor debate, but he was more concerned about the potential 
constitutional implications of permitting Congress to accept the abolitionist 
petitions.  Since the Middle Ages, legislatures had documented the receipt of 
petitions through the process of enrollment.  The nature of the petition, the 
name of the petitioner, and its disposition were recorded in the Journal books 
of Parliament, and later of colonial assemblies and of Congress.345  
Enrollment served an administrative purpose, but it also acted as a catalogue 
of legislatures’ expanding jurisdictions. Legislatures strategized to expand the 
scope of their activity by accepting new classes of petitions which demanded 
new forms of relief.  Over time, petitions came to be used expressly for 
constitutional advocacy, the Petition of Right being the preeminent example 
of this phenomenon in England.  Likewise, the American colonies used 
petitioning to expand the scope of their autonomous political activity prior 
to formal independence.  In short, for a legislature to accept a petition, and 
to document that acceptance on its formal records, was a political act which 
had legal consequences.346   
Calhoun understood this.  There was little possibility that any of these 
petitions would succeed in their ostensible objective of abolishing slavery or 
the slave trade in the District of Columbia.  But by forcing Congress to 
formally receive them, the petitioners were advancing a longer-term 
objective by establishing precedent for Congress to consider the question.  
Even if the petitions were never debated, the legislature would have implicitly 
acknowledged its authority to implement restrictions on slavery.  Calhoun 
was acutely sensitive to the precarious constitutional status of slavery and felt 
that a determination by Congress as to whether it did or did not have the 
authority to limit the institution would be critical to the South’s cause.  “On 
the decision, then, of the question of receiving,” Calhoun explained, in 
defending the gag rule, “depends the important question of jurisdiction.  To 
receive is to take jurisdiction—to give an implied pledge to investigate and 
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decide on the prayer, to give the petition a place in our archives, and become 
responsible for its safe-keeping.”347   
[Whoever voted for receiving, and recording, that petition] on the ground 
on which its reception is placed, votes that Congress is bound to take 
jurisdiction of the question of abolishing slavery both here and in the States; 
gives an implied pledge to take the subject under consideration; and orders 
the petition to be placed among the public records for safe-keeping.348   
Calhoun—who professed his “high estimation” for the “institutions of 
our English ancestors”—argued that the precedents of Parliament and 
Congress established that neither house was under any obligation to receive 
a petition and cited a series of instances in which the House of Commons 
resolved to refuse certain classes of petitions as proof.349  
The petitions’ defenders understood the larger implications of the dispute 
as well.  While proponents often downplayed the potential constitutional 
significance of the precedent they were seeking (preferring to focus on the 
less controversial issue of the petitioners’ First Amendment rights), they did 
occasionally acknowledge that dispute had implications for defining the 
scope of Congress’s authority to regulate slavery under Article I.  Caleb 
Cushing of Massachusetts, for instance, made a lengthy defense of the right 
of citizens to petition the House of Representatives in which he focused 
primarily on the ancient constitutional pedigree of petitioning.  But Cushing 
also engaged Calhoun’s jurisdictional arguments, which were being 
advanced concurrently in the House by Southern congressmen.  He rejected 
the argument that a petition had to request relief that was clearly within 
Congress’s constitutional power to provide in order to be received.  He 
“ask[ed] of the House how it appears that we have no right by the 
Constitution to legislate upon the subject-matter of the petition? It may be 
so; and it may not. One member of the House has earnestly averred that it 
is; another that it is not.”350  The constitutional question had never been 
clearly determined, and thus, Cushing concluded, “I cannot think it becomes 
the House to decide either way, upon the mere ipse dixit of individual 
members.”351  
To the contrary, he insisted that abolitionist petitions should be received 
precisely because the legislature’s jurisdiction to regulate slavery was so 
vigorously disputed.  The controversy over abolition was precipitating a 
political crisis which required a constitutional resolution that, Cushing 
argued, only Congress was able to provide by formally adjudicating the 
matter.   
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If there be any plausible reason for supposing that we have the right to 
legislate on the slave interests of the District,” he warned, “you cannot put 
down the investigation of the subject out of doors, by refusing to receive 
petitions. On the contrary, you give the petitioners new force and efficiency, 
by giving them a new cause of complaint and of excitement.352   
If, as the South protested, Congress had no right to regulate slavery, it 
should employ its traditional practice of referring the matter to a committee, 
receiving a “deliberate report,” and entering a resolution on its Journals 
declaring as much.353  Indeed, Cushing pointed out, Congress already had 
employed this method to resolve precisely the same question as early as 1790.  
In that year, anti-slavery petitions had been referred to a select committee at 
the urging of James Madison; the committee had rendered a report to the 
Committee of the Whole House, concluding that Article I did not empower 
Congress to abolish slavery; and that report was “discussed on four successive 
days; . . . reported to the House with amendments, and by the House ordered 
to be inscribed on its Journals, and then laid on the table.”354  
Cushing’s arguments, and those like them, turned the South’s reasoning 
on its head.  The role of the Journals was not to exclude disputed 
constitutional arguments, but rather to resolve them.  As he explained of the 
1791 resolution purporting to limit Article I jurisdiction over slavery:  
Congress calmly and considerately examined the whole broad question, not 
of the slave trade only, but also of the slave interest.  It decided how far it 
could go, and how far it would go. Its decision went forth to the world and 
settled the questions involved in it, as it were, forever.355   
If petition opponents were so sure of their constitutional footing, they 
should allow the same method of adjudication to take its course fifty years 
later.356  This perspective did little to appease slavery’s defenders, as 
adjudication was precisely what they were attempting to avoid.  Because 
precedential lawmaking was iterative, the opinions of a single Congress (or 
Parliament, or court) were never permanent—they were subject to revision 
and change over time, as even a cursory review of the history of legislative 
Journals would confirm.  While Southern legislators might have been able to 
extract a resolution forbidding Congress from regulating the domestic slave 
trade in 1790, as the battle over abolition intensified they felt less confident 
of their ability to secure a similar resolution in 1836, let alone ten or twenty 
years in the future.  The safer course was to secure a rule that prevented the 
issue from being adjudicated at all, however inconsistent it might be with the 
underlying purpose of legislative Journal-keeping.  
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As with Jackson’s censure, what modern historians have overlooked in 
analyzing the petition controversy is the substantive legal importance of 
legislative Journals in the early republican era.  The authoritative records of 
congressional proceedings elucidated the contours of the Constitution.  No 
less than in Stuart England, controlling the contents of those records meant, 
in effect, controlling constitutional interpretation.  It is true that at least in 
the case of slavery, congressional attempts to resolve constitutional questions 
(like judicial ones) did not avert civil war.  But the importance of Journals 
extended beyond a discrete set of legal issues.  Journals represented an 
alternative means of making and refining constitutional doctrine; a medium 
of constitutional discourse that often reached issues that courts could not or 
would not resolve themselves.  
III.  THE RISE OF LEGISLATIVE TRANSPARENCY 
Questions regarding the separation of powers, or the nature of Congress’s 
constitutional obligations under Article I, did not disappear in the later 
decades of the nineteenth century.  On the contrary, they have persisted to 
the present.357  And federal courts decline to adjudicate many of these 
disputes, because they are considered to be within the exclusive purview of 
the political branches.  But this begs the question: why, then, did the Journals 
decline in prominence in the United States after the 1830s? Why did Journal-
keeping procedure not evolve and mature—as it did in seventeenth-century 
England—to resolve such disputes?  Many scholars have noted the difficulties 
caused by the lack of a clear body of legal precedent in these areas.358  The 
episodes involving Jackson’s censure and the slavery petitions provide a 
glimpse of what such an evolution might have looked like.  The Journals 
remained—and still remain—the primary source for adjudicating disputes 
over legislative procedure, which is a constitutionally important body of 
precedent. But they did not expand to resolve new conflicts involving broader 
questions of law.  
This Part advances two related explanations for the decline of Journal-
keeping as a constitutionally meaningful practice.  First, as the nineteenth 
century advanced, the Journals were eclipsed in prominence by a new form 
of legislative recordkeeping: transcripts of debate in the House and Senate.  
Prior to the nineteenth century, legislative sittings in both the United States 
and Britain had been conducted in secret.  The Houses of Commons and 
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Lords met in secret from their earliest origins until the early 1800s.  Nearly 
every colonial legislature met in secret;359 the Continental Congress met in 
secret; the Constitution was drafted in secret;360 and, while the House of 
Representatives opened its doors to debate in 1789, the Senate refused to 
permit observation of its debates until the year 1795.361  And even after 
Congressional debates became putatively public, both houses made liberal 
use of their right to invoke the “injunction of secrecy” to seal debates from 
public view.  Indeed, many executive sessions of the Senate remained secret 
as a matter of course well into the nineteenth and even twentieth century. 
Deliberations on executive nominations were only made public in 1929.362 
As the franchise steadily expanded363 and communication technology 
improved,364 the public began to seek more information about the positions 
their elected representatives were taking on key political issues. As a result of 
these converging trends, by the early nineteenth century, demands for 
greater transparency in Congress could no longer be ignored.  Almost 
simultaneously in England and America, legislatures began not only to 
permit observation of their debates, but to permit the recording and printing 
of them for mass circulation.  In England, Hansard began to print verbatim 
accounts of parliamentary debates in 1803.365  In the United States, 
newspaper accounts of House debates appeared beginning in 1789, and 
accounts of Senate debates appeared beginning when that chamber lifted its 
general rule of secrecy in 1795.  
These reports of debates emerged, initially, to serve a political role, rather 
than an institutional one.  In America, legislative secrecy was a contested 
issue from the first session of Congress.  Republicans viewed legislative 
transparency as a means of checking Federalist attempts to expand the power 
of the national government.  As one Republican newspaper in Philadelphia 
declared in 1794, “[s]ecrecy and dissimulation are the foundations on which 
despotism stands, and tyrants reign only by keeping people in ignorance. 
Candor and publicity are the characteristics of free government.”366  In the 
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1790s, legislative transparency appeared to be largely a Republican issue, 
with many fearful of Federalist machinations around the First National Bank 
and the assumption of Revolutionary War debts.  John Beckley—a staunch 
Jeffersonian when not acting in his capacity as congressional Clerk—
coauthored a pamphlet with James Monroe in 1793 in which they attacked 
the bank and used the occasion to decry Senate secrecy as destructive of 
democratic accountability.  Monroe and Beckley wrote:  
The best expedient which policy could dictate to remedy those 
inconveniences resulting from the [distance between representatives and 
their constituents], was by opening their doors, to subject their legislative 
discussion to the free and common audience of every citizen, and to promote 
the free and rapid circulation of the newspapers.  But has this been done?  
On the contrary, have we not seen with amazement, one branch of the 
legislature, withdraw itself into a sequestered chamber, and shut its doors 
upon its constituents, still guarding them with obstinate perseverance, 
although more than one half the union have required that they be opened?367  
The Senate Journal records that votes on the repeated motions to open 
Senate debate split mostly along party lines.368   
But Republicans did not have a monopoly on pious demands for 
transparency. Under Republican administrations, Federalist papers began 
turning Republicans’ insistence on open legislation against them.  The New 
York Gazette, for instance, criticized the secrecy surrounding Congress’s 
decision to declare war against Britain in 1812, writing that “whenever a 
Congress shall be elected, independent and honest enough to strip the veil 
from the Journals of Congress, the most shameful arts, the most paltry 
intrigues, will rush forth to astonish this abused and suffering people.”369  And 
indeed, while secrecy died hard in the Senate, many elected representatives 
welcomed the opportunity to communicate more regularly with their 
constituents through printed debates.  In both England and America, the 
publication of legislative speeches in print offered a means to grandstand 
before mass electioneering was practical.370  The records of debate, which 
began as private newspaper accounts and steadily evolved into what has 
become the Congressional Record, fulfilled that purpose.  Where the Journals 
contained the official records of the legislature’s votes, acts, and resolutions—
its binding decisions, approved by the body as a whole—the records of 
debate contained detailed transcripts of speeches given by individual 
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legislators.  This allowed for the communication of policy positions between 
elected representatives and their constituents.371  
The establishment of reporting on congressional debate is arguably the 
first triumph of the concept that has become known as government 
transparency.  It provided voters with more knowledge, and thus more 
political control, over a branch of government than had ever been available 
previously and represented a major advance in democratic accountability. 
But the records of debate were a fundamentally different sort of document 
from the Journals.  The records were not law-producing documents, but 
political ones.  They did not represent the binding judgment of an entire 
house of Congress on a question of legal precedent.  Rather, they collated 
the individual political positions of hundreds of legislators on countless 
political issues, some of national and some of purely local concern.  The first 
contemporaneously published collection of congressional speeches, the 
Register of Debates, was intended to collect politically engaging speeches, rather 
than provide an institutional history of the Congress or its legislative activity.  
As Joseph Gales and William Seaton, the Register’s publishers, explicitly stated 
in their introduction to the inaugural issue, the purpose of the publication 
was to supply relevant and timely political information, rather than an official 
history of Congress: “the object” of the Register, they wrote, was: 
to embody the Debates and striking Incidents only of the sittings of 
Congress[.] [T]he possessor of this volume will be disappointed if he looks 
to find in it a Journal of the two Houses of Congress. No part of their 
Proceedings is given except what involves Debate, or some Incident, novel 
or important in its character, and therefore worthy of preservation.372   
In contrast to the strict norms of accuracy that governed Journal-keeping, 
accusations of political manipulation of the debate transcripts were 
commonplace, and occasionally even acknowledged by the publishers 
themselves.  In an era when most newspapers were openly partisan toward 
either Federalist or Republican interests, which printers had access to which 
debates often depended on whether the party with which they were aligned 
controlled the Speakership.373  And the newspapers in which debates 
appeared often doubled as both vehicles for political editorials, and as 
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legislative activity changed considerably.  Id. at 238.   
 372 1 REG. DEB. 1 (1825). 
 373 William E. Ames, A History of the “National Intelligencer” 27 (1972). 
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platforms for Federalist or Republican politicians to communicate directly 
with constituents.374  Joseph Gales, for instance, developed a reputation for 
aiding opponents of Andrew Jackson in the records of debate.375  In short, 
where the Journals were intended to record generational shifts in 
constitutional norms, the records of debate were intended to provide 
information about individual policy positions in as close to real time as 
possible.  Thomas Hart Benton made this distinction clear in an 1848 report 
to the Senate, which was later cited by the Joint Committee on Printing to 
justify more extensive congressional reporting.  Benton argued:  
[I]t would be a very narrow construction [of the Journal Clause] and a very 
insufficient communication of the proceedings of Congress to the people to 
confine the publication . . . to the yeas and nays and the notice of bills and 
motions which appear on the journal. . . . Publicity is the soul of our 
Government action. The nature of our Government, the interests of the 
country, and the will of the people require publicity . . . .376 
As legislators began to tailor their behavior to the new mechanisms of 
accountability created by debate transcripts,377 the older tradition of 
legislative adjudication of constitutional questions receded.  The Journals 
had allowed Congress to define and defend the prerogatives of the legislature 
relative to the other branches of government.  But as transparency placed 
more power in the hands of voters and political parties, local and partisan 
concerns came to compete with institutional ones.378  
 
 374 Id. at 30–33.   
 375 An example of Gales manipulating congressional speeches for the benefit of Jacksonians is 
recounted at AMES, supra note 373, at 177.  See also EUGENE IRVING MCCORMAC, JAMES K. POLK: 
A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 22 (1922). 
 376 J. COMM. ON PRINTING, COST OF PUBLISHING THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, H.R. REP. NO. 43-
641, at 2 (1874) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting William G. Donnan). 
 377 Similar observations have been made about the response of legislators to televised floor debates.  It 
has been argued that speeches made for the benefit of C-SPAN are less focused on legislative 
substance, and more focused on signaling policy agreements to core constituencies.  See, e.g., Nancy 
S. Marder, The Conundrum of Cameras in the Courtroom, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1489, 1559 (2012).  Indeed, 
the manner in which such incentives distort the public records of Congress has been one argument 
in favor of courts ignoring congressional debates when analyzing legislative history.  See, e.g., 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 34–37 (1997); John F. Manning, Textualism as 
a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 683 (1997). 
 378 The Congressional Globe was replaced by the Congressional Record, which was printed by Congress, in 
1873.  See AMES, supra note 373, at 31–33.  But the creation of a government-printed record left the 
original, newspaper-based style of compiling transcripts virtually unchanged.  Indeed, when the 
Congressional Record was created in 1873, the House merely resolved to hire the staff of the 
Congressional Globe, which had succeeded the Register as the privately printed record of debate, in its 
entirety to continue in their same roles at the Congressional Record, where they would “hereafter, until 
otherwise ordered, be officers of the House, under the direction of the Speaker, who shall receive 
the same compensation now allowed to the official reporters of committees.”  See H.R. JOURNAL 
CLERK, 45TH CONG., DIGEST AND MANUAL OF THE RULES AND PRACTICE OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 324 (1877) (Henry H. Smith).  
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The second explanation for the decline in use of the Journals derives from 
a change in recordkeeping practices elsewhere in government. By the 1840s, 
judicial review came to displace more dispersed forms of constitutional 
adjudication such as departmentalism as the primary form of legal exposition 
in the United States.379  As John Langbein and others have shown, changes 
in recordkeeping and legal writing played a significant, yet underappreciated, 
role in bringing this evolution about.  As the focus of legislative recordkeeping 
was moving from structured records of precedent to unstructured transcripts 
of debate in the early nineteenth century, records of judicial decisions were 
moving in the opposite direction. In the early republic, the concept of formal, 
written judicial opinions that contributed to a body of legal precedent had 
not yet taken hold.380  Judges and juries were often inclined to resolve cases 
by reference to informal notions of fairness rather than to formal legal 
doctrine.381   
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, a group of elite jurists led 
by James Kent and Justice Joseph Story, among others, embarked on a 
sustained campaign to model American law and judging after European, and 
particularly English, traditions.  The project of producing “learned law” was 
antithetical to the practice and identity of much of the early American legal 
system.  Because courts often considered themselves to be instruments of 
popular democracy, applying communal traditions of justice rather than 
formal rules, they neither relied on nor generated written precedent.  While 
English law had produced a large collection of legal treatises, they were 
difficult for most American lawyers to access in the eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries.382  And even where these resources were available, 
courts were resistant to rely on them: There was still a pervasive hostility to 
the English legal profession in much of the country, as well as a democratic 
resistance to the notion of professional or scientific law generally.383  
In addition to ignoring English precedent, American courts generated 
comparatively little of their own. Legal opinions were not written or 
published, but were rather issued orally from the bench.384  And because the 
primary audience for these opinions was the parties and their counsel, rather 
than the bench generally or other institutions of government, early decisions 
rarely employed the kind of formal reasoning rooted in precedent that is now 
familiar.  As a result, no indigenous body of American case law emerged from 
 
 379 For a description of the turn toward judicial supremacy in the 1830s and 1840s, and the role that 
Story and others played in this evolution, see KRAMER, supra note 195, at 183–88. 
 380 See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 566–
68 (1993). 
 381 Id. at 571–72. 
 382 See, e.g., Zoey F. Orol, Note, Reading the Early American Legal Profession: A Study of the First 
American Law Review, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1523, 1524 (2012).  
 383 See Langbein, supra note 380, at 567–68. 
 384 See Langbein, supra note 380, at 571–72. 
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which judges could develop more sophisticated legal principles.385  The lack 
of meaningful, written documentation of cases was common to every state, 
and to the federal judiciary as well. In its early years, before the ascendance 
of John Marshall, even the United States Supreme Court lacked an official 
reporter, or a formal body of published case law.386  While oral dispositions 
of state and federal cases were occasionally recorded, and broken down into 
some sort of legal analysis by professional reporters looking to sell their 
products to practitioners, these records were notoriously inaccurate or 
incomplete.387  
The professionalist movement sought to change this, by mandating that 
the opinions of courts be written, printed and distributed.  The Supreme 
Court, spurred by Justice Story, regularized its reporting in 1816 with the 
appointment of Henry Wheaton as the court’s permanent reporter.388  State 
courts, led by Kent in New York, underwent a similar evolution in the first 
several decades of the nineteenth century.389  The growth of accurate, 
structured reporting of decisions was instrumental in creating the modern 
institutional identity of judicial courts.  The change enabled future courts to 
rely on precedent by creating that precedent and making it widely available 
for the first time.  More importantly, however, by regularizing the reporting 
and printing of judicial decisions—and by making clear that the purpose of 
this reporting was to provide material for precedent—the professionalists 
changed the way that American courts decided cases.390  Courts were forced 
to record and rationalize their decisions in such a way that they could fit into 
a broader universe of legal principles.  Because decisions had precedential 
effect, they had to be logically sound and broadly applicable in their 
reasoning.  They also had to consider the broader political implications of 
judicial decision-making.  
These changes reflect a specialization in the roles of the different 
branches, which record-keeping played an integral role in bringing about.  
As Kent and Story succeeded in their goal of restructuring American law 
along a hierarchy of reasoned, reported opinions, the judiciary became a 
more expository and analytical institution.  The records that defined it were 
the end product of litigation: a legal order accompanied by a mode of analysis 
derived from older, published precedent. At the same time, the legislature 
became less expository.  The records that came to define it after the early 
republican period were intended to be read by voters and partisan allies.  By 
encouraging the judiciary to adapt its practices and reasoning to the needs of 
 
 385 See Langbein, supra note 380, at 573–74. 
 386 See Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on 
Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1293–94 (1985). 
 387 Id. at 1303–04; see also Langbein, supra note 380, at 574–77. 
 388 See Joyce, supra note 386, at 1294, 1330–38. 
 389 See Langbein, supra note 380, at 578–81. 
 390 For an overview of this evolution and its contribution to the rise of judicial review, see KRAMER, 
supra note 195, at 148–52. 
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a sophisticated precedential system, reported cases strengthened the 
judiciary’s collective identity as a governmental institution.  By encouraging 
atomized recordkeeping and communication between legislators and their 
parties and constituents, the rise of the records of debate may have had the 
opposite effect.  
CONCLUSION 
What relevance do the Journal Clause and the history of legislative 
Journal-keeping have for contemporary law?  One answer is that the history 
of legislative Journal-keeping, which has never before been explored in any 
depth, provides valuable insight into how legislatures evolve as institutions, 
and how that evolution in turn shapes the broader constitutional order.  The 
division of functions and powers between governmental institutions is not 
static. Even in the United States, which operates under a written Constitution 
that delimits the powers of the three coordinate branches, the system of 
separated powers has changed considerably over time.391  The history of 
Journals provides insight into a key mechanism by which this change occurs. 
As the preceding sections have shown, Journal-keeping formed the basis for 
legislatures’ institutional identity.  Journals elucidated rules, procedures, and 
privileges for members that defined how the legislature effectuated its role in 
evolving democracies. They also recorded the resolution of key disputes with 
other branches of government, and thereby helped to define as a matter of 
law the relationship between the legislature and other institutions.  Journals 
demonstrate the importance of record-keeping in constitutional law, 
particularly in areas where traditional judicial review is often unavailable.  
The revolutionary shift between the 1780s and the 1830s from almost 
total legislative secrecy to total legislative transparency remains little studied.  
By the early nineteenth century, American courts were moving away from 
an arbitral model of adjudication, dominated by laypeople and largely 
unconcerned with formal precedent, and towards a more structured and 
hierarchical model of lawmaking.  During the same period, legislatures 
appear to have moved in the opposite direction—restrictions on the franchise 
were loosened, rules of secrecy were relaxed or abolished, and large portions 
of the citizenry (often in tandem with party organizations and partisan 
newspapers) began to exert an unprecedented degree of influence over the 
day-to-day activity of Congress, and the behavior of its members.  The 
practice of using ancient precedential records to resolve disputes of 
constitutional importance was gradually abandoned; the most important 
legislative records were those that informed the immediate landscape of party 
politics, not those that resolved institutional questions that might shape inter-
 
 391 See generally Flaherty, supra note 13 (describing the historical evolution of the separation of powers 
and summarizing contemporary accounts of its relevance). 
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branch relations for generations.  It is difficult to determine to what extent 
records caused these shifts in institutional identity, and to what extent they 
were used by ideologically motivated reformers (sophisticated party 
operatives, in the case of Congress; anti-populist judges like Kent and Story, 
in the case of the courts) to execute a preconceived political agenda.  But in 
either case, these changes in recordkeeping practices normalized a 
fundamental shift in how government actors perceive the boundary between 
law and politics.    
This development has had an important influence on how modern law 
conceptualizes inter-branch relations.  A number of the structural 
constitutional issues that the Journals evolved to adjudicate remain outside 
the scope of judicial resolution, either because they are committed to the 
legislature by the constitutional text or because they rely on norms of 
governmental behavior that do not present judicially manageable 
standards.392  These include consequential questions of legislative procedure 
(take, for instance, the question of whether the Senate is required to hold a 
vote for a President’s nomination to the Supreme Court, which was bitterly 
disputed following President Obama’s unsuccessful nomination of Judge 
Merrick Garland)393 and the separation of powers.394  But while Congress 
remains responsible for adjudicating these issues, contemporary observers no 
longer treat it as capable of resolving them through the reasoned application 
of legal principles.  Rather, Congress is presumed to be motivated primarily 
by partisan incentives.  Jeremy Waldron, for instance, has noted that there is 
a “deafening” silence in legal philosophy regarding the legal principles that 
govern legislative procedure; that “[t]here is nothing about legislatures or 
legislation in modern philosophical jurisprudence remotely comparable to 
the discussion of decision-making by judges.”395  This neglect, Waldron 
suggests, derives from modern law’s assumption that “[j]udicial reasoning 
poses a special problem for jurisprudence in the way that the reasoning of 
legislators does not,” because “[t]he processes by which courts reach their 
decisions . . . are supposed to be special and distinctive, not directly political, 
but interpretative of already established political conclusions or expressive of 
some underlying spirit of legality.”396  Argument in legislatures, by contrast, 
is “explicitly and unashamedly political,” reflecting “either the interplay of 
interests, or the direct clash of policy proposals and ideologies.”397 The 
 
 392 See supra note 21.   
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HARV. L. REV. 96, 106–10 (2017) (describing the constitutional debate over Garland’s nomination 
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 394 See, e.g., Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 9, 34–39 (describing the role of non-judicially enforceable 
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 395 Waldron, supra note 24, at 644. 
 396 Waldron, supra note 24, at 644. 
 397 Waldron, supra note 24, at 644. 
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constitutional “law” governing the relationship between the political 
branches has received similar treatment.  Some commentators have 
suggested that constitutional scholars should analyze questions about the 
limitations and distribution of power in American democracy not at the level 
of formal governmental institutions, but at the level of political interest 
groups. These are the parties who compete to capture and control 
governmental institutions, and who compete for real political power.398  For 
instance, Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes observe that the “Madisonian 
conception of separation of powers”—in which the “ambition” of competing 
institutions with different constitutional prerogatives is intended to prevent 
the consolidation of power in any single department of government—was 
preempted shortly after the ratification of the Constitution by partisan 
politics.399  Ideological competition “between the legislative and executive 
branches” was “displaced by competition between two major parties,” and 
as result the “machine” that was supposed to promote stable institutional 
norms and an equitable distribution of power “stopped running.”400 
This shift from institutional to political reasoning as the definitive 
dynamic in structural constitutionalism has caused alarm, particularly as 
political polarization has increased in recent decades.  Observers have 
worried that the partisan commitments of legislative and executive officials 
will so outweigh their institutional commitments, that they will be willing to 
undermine longstanding norms of legislative procedure or inter-branch 
comity in order to score short-term victories.401  This dynamic, the argument 
goes, threatens to permanently subordinate second-order commitments to 
the republican process to first-order policy goals, leading to entrenched 
dysfunction.402  Interpretations of constitutional rules are motivated less by 
fidelity to the principle of separated powers, and more by the maximalist 
commitment to political victory.403  Brinksmanship animated by sharply 
divergent views of the relative powers of the political branches becomes more 
 
 398 See John Ferejohn, Power in Public Law: Some Reactions, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 9 (2016).  
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common,404 and political actors become increasingly willing to accuse their 
opponents of “bad faith” interpretations of constitutional commitments.405  
In the extreme, these showdowns may lead to “constitutional crises” in which 
disputes over legal authority are resolved not by reasoned discourse, but by 
the use of force.406  
But while there is a vast literature that describes—and laments—the 
politicization of structural constitutionalism, there have been surprisingly few 
attempts to locate the ultimate causes of this dysfunction.  Scholarship 
generally assumes that partisan rather than institutional competition is the 
operative dynamic within the political branches; it rarely questions whether 
this development was inevitable.  The history of the Journal Clause 
demonstrates that within the Legislative Branch deliberate choices were 
made in the development of recordkeeping practices that ultimately rendered 
Congress more responsive to partisan concerns than to institutional ones.  
Two models of legislative recordkeeping existed at the beginning of the early 
Republic: one (the Journals) was based on precedential lawmaking, and 
focused on adjudicating the competing prerogatives of constitutional actors; 
the other (the records of debate) was rooted in politics, and focused on 
holding legislators accountable to their constituents and party.  By the middle 
of the nineteenth century, the former model, despite playing a critical role in 
constitutional law for centuries, had faded into obscurity, while the latter had 
become a powerful force in shaping legislative behavior.  This change was a 
crucial but now largely forgotten factor in facilitating the displacement of 
institutional concerns within the Legislative Branch with partisan ones. 
 Thus, if the “law” of legislative procedure or the “law” of inter-branch 
relations seems to modern observers to be uniquely unreasoned—uniquely 
subject to the vicissitudes of partisanship—that is in part because the 
legislature was incentivized by its own record-making regime to 
conceptualize legal disputes in that way.  Records are accountability 
mechanisms.  They provide a narrative of what the record-keeper does and 
why.  As scholars have observed in the context of administrative law, a society 
shapes the institutions it is governed by in part by determining the type of 
records those institutions keep (i.e., the categories of information those 
records contain) and the audience toward whom those records are addressed 
(i.e., the interest groups to whom the institution is to be held accountable).407  
To the extent that earlier generations of legislators opted to emphasize a 
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uniquely political form of recordkeeping in their legislative practice, it is not 
surprising that the result was an institution that often reasons and behaves in 
an explicitly political way.  But this choice has unnecessarily limited modern 
lawyers’ ability to conceptualize alternative models of legislative reasoning.  
Waldron has observed that legislatures lack “an ideal type or theoretical 
model that would do for our understanding of legislation what, for example,” 
Ronald Dworkin’s idealized judge, Hercules, “purports to do for adjudicative 
reasoning.”408  This disparity may derive in part from the fact that courts 
have spent the last two centuries developing and refining models of formal 
dispute resolution, thanks to the project of learned law.409  If a judge such as 
Hercules wanted to develop an idealized model of adjudication, he would 
have ample source material to work with.  If, by contrast, a hypothetical 
legislature were to attempt a similar project—improving its rules of 
procedure, and developing formal mechanisms whereby disputes over 
constitutional requirements could be definitively settled through the 
application of legal reasoning—it would have to start mostly from scratch, 
because the system of recordkeeping that could have formed the basis for 
such an endeavor was abandoned generations ago.  
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